



## **EXAMINING U.S. IRREGULAR WARFARE DOCTRINE**

Graduate Research Project

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AFIT/ILM/ENS/08-04

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EXAMINING U.S. IRREGULAR WARFARE DOCTRINE

Presented to the Faculty

Department of Operational Sciences

Graduate School of Engineering and Management

Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

Air Education and Training Command

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Master of Logistics Management

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June 2008

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## **Abstract**

The United States' overwhelming conventional military superiority has forced its enemies for the foreseeable future to fight it unconventionally, mixing modern technology with the classic techniques of insurgency and terrorism. In response to the associated strategic challenges, a growing debate occurred and continues among military historians, strategists, and leaders about the proper principles necessary for contemporary irregular warfare, particularly against a potential transnational enemy. Without a Joint Publication to serve as a guide, several of the individual services have recently published updated doctrine to address the subject: *Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3: Irregular Warfare* in August 2007 and *Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24: Counterinsurgency* in December 2006 (jointly published as *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5: Counterinsurgency*).

*Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency* has an anticipated release of May 2009. The detailed content analysis of *AFDD 2-3*, *FM 3-24*, and several authoritative documents required to construct a House of Quality provided several insights for the doctrine writers; each document was contrasted against the authoritative works and against each other. Similarities, differences, missing fundamentals, and overarching doctrinal concepts were determined by examining this study's Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality and can guide the writers in critical concepts for inclusion. Additionally, analysis revealed some implications if the enemy proves to be truly transnational instead of the more traditional state-base threats.

*To My Loving Wife & Understanding Boys –*

*For Your Support During This Research and My Entire Army Career.  
I Could Not Do Any of It Without You.*

*Finally, to my Inspirational Grandfather for the Example You Still Provide.*

## Acknowledgments

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my faculty advisor, Dr. Richard Deckro, for his guidance and tireless support throughout the course of this research project. His critical feedback on my submissions, Socratic approach to my assertions, and historical reinforcement of his observations were vital to my exploration of this highly contentious topic. Additionally, I would like to thank LTC John A. Nagl for proposing the basic idea for this study during his visit to AFIT in October of 2007. His devotion to the subject and dedication to sharing his opinions – like that of Dr. David Kilcullen, Dr. Kalev Sepp, LTC Gian Gentile, T.X. Hammes and Maj Gen Charles Dunlap – continue to flame the desire in me to further examine, question, and debate the topics surrounding Irregular Warfare.

James M. Kimbrough IV

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# **EXAMINING U.S. IRREGULAR WARFARE DOCTRINE**

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

Indeed, history shows us that smaller, irregular forces – insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists – have for centuries found ways to harass and frustrate larger, regular armies and sow chaos....We can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time.

--- Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, October 2007

### **Background & Problem Statement**

The United States' overwhelming conventional military superiority has forced its enemies to fight unconventionally, mixing modern technology with the classic techniques of insurgency and terrorism (*FM3-24*, 2006:ix). Even the most cursory review of recent military history teaches these enemies to mimic the tactics of American foes in Vietnam or Somalia and avoid conflicts like the Gulf Wars. In the Quadrennial Defense Review Report from February 2006, the authors highlight that this transformation in our contemporary strategic environment has triggered revolutionary changes in the Department of Defense's (DoD) area of emphasis:

- From nation-state threats – to decentralized networks from non-state enemies.
- From conducting war against nations – to conducting war in countries we are not at war with (safe havens).
- From major conventional combat operations – to multiple irregular, asymmetric operations.
- From separate military Service concepts of operation – to joint and combined operations.
- From forces that need to deconflict – to integrated, interdependent forces (DoD, 2006, vi-vii).

These strategic challenges have ignited a debate among military historians, strategists, and leaders about the proper principles necessary for contemporary irregular warfare, particularly against a transnational enemy. The leaders of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have diverse opinions on the subject and find themselves struggling to determine their respective service's proper role, domain, and function inside the National Strategy for irregular war. Several of the services have recently published updated doctrine on the subject: *Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3: Irregular Warfare* in August 2007 and *Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24: Counterinsurgency* in December 2006 (jointly published as *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5: Counterinsurgency*). For brevity reasons only, *Counterinsurgency* will be referred to by its Army identification number (*FM 3-24*); this is not intended to detract from the contribution of the US Marine Corps in developing or writing the doctrine.

The branches of the military have a growing requirement, and even need, to become more *joint*; that is, work closer with the other branches in order to defeat the enemies of the United States of America. President Dwight D. Eisenhower first envisioned the *joint force* in 1958 when he said, “Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war we will fight in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort” (“Toward,” 1958:unk). Despite the huge strides made since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, barriers still exist to reaching the goal of the DoD being truly united, especially in irregular warfare. One of the largest barriers to DoD achieving unification

of its separate services are the *expert opinions* crafted in order to clamor for a larger portion of the defense budget or to prove the supremacy of one force over another.

Despite the massive volume of recently published irregular warfare material, there currently exists no unifying military doctrine to describe the function of each service in irregular conflict. In the absence of a Joint Publication on the subject, the services have to rely on their respective doctrine or historical publications on the subject for guidance. By thoroughly examining the different services' publications, a consensus might be uncovered. This cross service analysis holds the potential to be a significant step toward achieving the goal of becoming more *joint*, instead of four separate services. With such improved interaction, the likelihood of defeating our enemy's on future asymmetrical battlefields dominated by irregular warfare will be dramatically improved. Finally on 11 September 2007, the Department of Defense began the process for formally creating Joint Doctrine for Irregular Warfare by publishing the *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*. The *IW JOC* is intended to place a band-aid on the doctrine void for the joint forces commander and serve as a planning document for the doctrine writer to fully develop the concepts into an officially published Joint Publication. The basic logic of this document can be found in Appendix D.

### **Research Objectives, Research Questions, and Hypotheses**

The classic warfare theories (i.e. Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and so forth) directly apply to this research since they form the basic foundation for most of America's conventional military doctrine. The modern updates applicable to irregular warfare (i.e. Galula, Mao Tse-tung, 4<sup>th</sup> Generation of Warfare, among others) helped to examine the specific aspects of the newly published doctrine. Additionally, the fundamentals about joint

warfare, as published in our current Joint Publications, formulate complementary attributes or functions necessary for irregular warfare. Through this thorough analysis of the newly published doctrine, this study answers the following questions:

- How are FM 3-24 and AFDD 2-3 similar?
- How are FM 3-24 and AFDD 2-3 different?
- What fundamentals are missing from FM 3-24 and AFDD 2-3?
- What should/could be the overarching joint doctrine which would guide the individual services' doctrine and allow them to complement each other?
- What are some implications if the enemy proves to be truly transnational instead of the more traditional state-based threat?

## **Research Focus**

Part of the genesis of the debate between the branches of the military on how to properly conduct irregular warfare may well be based, in part, on the fact they are operating from different sets of assumptions, definitions, and doctrinal principles or procedures. This study focused on published and approved doctrine to determine if a gap exists in the different branches' understanding of irregular warfare and where the doctrine are concurrent, complementary, or in conflict. While there are other draft manuals currently in various forms, they are not appropriate for consideration at this time. Subsequent revisions or releases could make some or all of the conclusions drawn in the study obsolete or highlight new ones. Additionally, this study considered numerous sources outside of official DoD publications for determining critical areas that may be missing from *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* and *AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare*.

## **Theoretical Lens**

Since most Western military doctrine can trace its foundation back to the great military philosophers of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, their theories on the conduct of warfare, and its close tie to politics, form the basis for examining the content of the manuals. The Marine Corps' *Small Wars Manual* of 1940 was critical in gaining insight into the more modern doctrine. David Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* provides the primary theory for the counterinsurgency aspects of the documents. *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* by John Nagl also assisted in the examination. For the insurgent aspects of the doctrine, the works of Mao Tse-Tung and Che Guevara, combined with the *Al Qaeda Training Manual* discovered in Manchester, England, provide further foundations for the comparisons. Additional insights were also gleaned by using Bard O'Neill's *Insurgency and Terrorism* and Thomas Hammes' *The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Dr. David Kilcullen's numerous articles about the theory of a global insurgency helped examine that topic in the different manuals. The Department of Defense's Joint Publication series provided a basis for examining the service's doctrine for conformance to principles of joint warfare. Finally, there are numerous theories about irregular warfare published in professional journals that were considered for inclusion as a basis for comparison.

## **Methodology**

This research is primarily a qualitative analysis that utilizes content analysis to capture the key points in the existing authoritative literature. Based on those critical points, a House of Quality-like model was constructed using the authoritative literature's

points as the *customer attributes* and the different military doctrine's key concepts as the *counterpart characteristics*. A comprehensive study was then conducted on *FM 3-24* and *AFDD 2-3* in order to determine the key points proposed by the doctrine writers. These key points from the doctrinal documents were compared to those included in the House of Quality from the existing authoritative literature in order to capture congruence, conflict, complements, and missing aspects of the Army's and the Air Force's doctrine.

Additionally, based on the theoretical projections for the future operating environment provided by the theories of Thomas P.M. Barnett, David Kilcullen, Thomas Hammes, and others, a gap analysis was conducted to determine if the doctrine could be suitable against a transnational enemy and not constrained to just nation-based irregular warfare. The final Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality is a single point of reference for the critical points that should be included in future Joint Publications focused on irregular warfare. The data required for this research was found in the recently approved *AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare* and *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*; versions were obtained from official DoD sources.

### **Assumptions and Limitations**

The principle assumption made during this research is that the historical lessons that become the foundations for the military doctrine can transcend time. In other words, the doctrine is broad enough to be applied in future conflicts but not so narrowly defined that it only leads to success in the last war fought. Commanders must fully understand the operational environment in order to properly apply doctrine to the challenges they face.

It is also assumed that the *Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency* will not be approved or published by the time this project is completed. According to one of the writers of *JP 3-24*, the current anticipated release date for the doctrine is no earlier than May of 2009 (Joint Staff, 2007:3). *JP 3-24* might prove to be a good subject for subsequent research to analyze its key points compared to the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality built in this study. Additionally, the USMC's *Small-Unit Leader's Guide to Counterinsurgency* is intentionally omitted because of its strict focus at the tactical level of war and the fact that most of its key points were incorporated in the later published *FM 3-24*. There has also been several draft versions of an updated edition of *Small Wars Manual* omitted since no official publication has been issued.

This research is limited by the lack of independent Navy or Coast Guard doctrine for irregular warfare. Recommendations for joint doctrine have been made solely based on the doctrinal publications of the Army/USMC and the Air Force. This analysis is also limited by the lack of published irregular warfare doctrine from a Joint or NATO perspective.

The much broader title of *AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare* implies it is intended to examine all operations composing the irregular warfare, but *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* only examines one aspect of the IW spectrum. This disparity limited the ability to compare both documents on a truly equal basis and caused the identification of some differences that were inherent in their scope. The analysis is also limited since the respective authors wrote their manuals for the peculiarities of their services and were not intended to be applicable at the joint level.

## **Implications**

The impact of this study is a single source for reviewing how the services treat irregular warfare in their published doctrine. It provides a better starting point for the continued debate over the roles each service should play in the joint fight against our enemies utilizing irregular warfare. Finally, the research identified gaps, short falls, overlaps, and potential areas for collaboration in future versions of the different service's doctrine and future joint publications. These voids must be addressed by the authors of the yet to be published *Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency* or other doctrinal documents focused on irregular warfare.

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

After the Vietnam War, we purged ourselves of everything that dealt with irregular warfare or insurgency, because it had to do with how we lost that war. In hindsight, that was a bad decision.

--- General Jack Keane, Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (*NewsHour*, 2006).

### **Overview**

Before the summer of 2004 when the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan was acknowledged by national level leadership, very few newly published books focused on irregular warfare. Updates to our doctrinal manuals focused on the correct, or perhaps better, employment of our *transformed* high-tech systems in a traditional war against a nation-based enemy executed with our plethora of conventional units and weapons. Professional military articles discussing the subject of irregular warfare were using history to highlight the leadership challenges faced by those involved but seldom looked at the strategic or tactical lessons from such conflicts.

As late as October of 2005, most senior leaders inside of the Pentagon showed more interest in examining and applauding the success of the methods used in the *Shock and Awe* and the *March to Baghdad* campaign. Little interest was placed on considering the intricacies of irregular warfare because the enemies were viewed as just *former regime loyalists* or some lingering *die hard loyalists*. Counterinsurgency methods instantly garnered attention when “Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced a ‘clear-hold-build’ strategy for Iraq steeped in classical counterinsurgency theory” (Ucko, 2008:302). At the national level this strategy was further refined with the publication of *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* from the National Security Council and outlined an

approach that included three separate tracks with a simple three word description: Political (Isolate, Engage, Build), Security (Clear, Hold, Build), and Economic (Restore, Reform, Build) (NSC, 2005:8-9).

This announcement, combined with the subsequent developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, sparked an explosion of published material on the subject of irregular warfare and generated an eruption of debates across all forms of media. Leaders inside of the DoD suddenly began reading and including on their *recommended reading lists* books like David Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, Mao Tse-Tung's *On Guerrilla Warfare*, T.E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph* and John Nagl's *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. This was a huge cultural shift from the dominance of traditional and conventional warfare material; arguably this shift is still on-going to varying degrees across all components of the Department of Defense.

Filling the void of contemporary material on irregular warfare, authors began to compose and publish new material on the subject, both on the how-to conduct operations and historical case studies. Since 2005 in particular, there has been an exponential increase in articles and monographs by military authors devoted to the subject of COIN (Ucko, 2008:294-295). Additionally, publishers began offering updated versions of the books generally thought of as classics. The military's professional journals joined the trend as COIN material was requested from their contributors and often chosen over conventional warfare topics. As the military found itself fighting against an irregular enemy, scholars, military members, and reporters were busy writing on the subject. As Dr. David Kilcullen noted, COIN once again became fashionable; "more has been written

on it in the last four years than the last four decades” (Kilcullen, 2006a:1). Ultimately, the elements inside of the DoD began to publish new doctrine in order to provide its forces guidance in how to best wage this *newly rediscovered* warfare it found itself intimately embroiled in fighting. First the Army published *FM 3-24* in December of 2006, and then Air Force published *AFDD 2-3* in August of 2007.

This chapter begins with a general description of the House of Quality and its basic construction steps. Next, some foundational definitions of terms applicable to doctrine, joint warfare, and irregular warfare are presented. The third portion is a summary of the key authoritative irregular warfare material. Following is a review of the several theories about the future of warfare and the international security environment that could provide insight into the strengths and flaws of the newly published doctrinal material. Concluding this chapter is a summary of the published critiques of *FM 3-24*.

## **House of Quality (HOQ)**

### ***Introduction to HOQ***

During the 1970s, Mitsubishi and Toyota developed Quality Function Deployment (QDF) to integrate customer requirements throughout the entire design process. QFD promotes a philosophy about quality and utilizes a set of communication tools that achieve that integration. “The voice of the customer, rather than by edicts of top management or opinions” drives everything under QDF (Evans, 1993: 152). At the strategic level, QDF shifts from a narrow focus of simply achieving results to a much broader focus of how those results are best obtained. At the operational and tactical levels, QDF advocates gathering the customers’ desires prior to starting the design process for a product. Traditionally, based on customer feedback, the product was

redesigned or improved after the lengthy process of R&D, testing, production, distribution, and advertising has already promoted and delivered the product to market. As part of QDR, this wasted effort is eliminated by identifying the customer needs and desires at the start (Evans, 1993:150-152). One of QDR's critical tools to accomplish this integration is the House of Quality.

The House of Quality (HOQ) is a graphic tool for determining and defining the relationship between the desires of the customers and the capabilities of the firm or a particular product. The HOQ becomes a conceptual map that provides interfunctional planners a means to communicate. “People with different problems and responsibilities can thrash out design priorities while referring to patterns of evidence on the house’s grid” (Hauser, 1988:63-64). “The house relieves no one of the responsibility of making tough decisions. It does provide the means for all participants to debate priorities” (Hauser, 1988:68). As the DoD’s writers shape the joint doctrine for COIN, a HOQ examining the critical aspects for irregular warfare should greatly facilitate the absolutely necessary interservice communication as the writers attempt to create synergy from the separate services and strengths within the services.

### ***Building the House of Quality***

When describing the HOQ, the academic authors emphasize that this tool was intended to be configured in order to match the needs of a particular organization (Hauser, 1998:68). For the purposes of this research, the construction and content of the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality (IWC HOQ) has been modified to match the goals of this research. For the business community, James R. Evans and William M.

Lindsay in their textbook, *The Management and Control of Quality*, suggests that the basic HOQ can be built in six steps.

1. Identify customer attributes.
2. Identify counterpart characteristics.
3. Relate the customer attributes to the counterpart characteristics.
4. Conduct an evaluation of competing products.
5. Evaluate counterpart characteristics and develop targets.
6. Determine which counterpart characteristic to deploy in the remainder of the product process (Evans, 1993:152-153).

This construction process is further defined in Chapter III, of this paper along with a detailed explanation of its modifications in order to build the IWC HOQ.

### **Department of Defense Essential Terms and Concepts**

#### ***Military Doctrine***

Every profession, organization, or academic field of study has its own set of principles, fundamentals, and values. For military organizations, this foundation can be found in its doctrine. GEN George H. Decker, Army Chief of Staff from 1960-1962, described doctrine as providing “a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort” (*JP 1*, 2007:I-1).

Metaphorically, it provides the skeletal structure for all military operations. At higher levels, it bridges the gap between national policies or objectives and the military operations to impose, enforce, or achieve those stated goals. At all levels of the military, doctrine provides a common starting point for all military training, operational planning, and mission execution (*JP 1*, 2007:I-1).

Despite being criticized for sometimes being too backwards-looking, military doctrine remains important to war fighters; when appropriately and judiciously applied it provides extremely valuable insights to achieve successful mission accomplishment. Based on historical lessons learned, military doctrine captures and advocates what has proven to work best in a situation. Doctrine provides time-tested guidelines that have stood up to the crucible of analysis, experimentation, and practice (*JP 1*, 2007:I-1). While doctrine is intended to be followed except under the most unique and remarkable circumstances, the commander's judgment based on the situation remains paramount. At a minimum, military leaders should consider and consult the current published doctrine, especially when the commander decides to not adhere to its guidance for his particular mission (*JP 1*, 2007:A-1).

Interestingly, the American forces have often been accused of failing to follow their own doctrine when conducting operations. A common quote, most commonly attributed to an unknown Russian military document or to an unknown German officer, highlights the benefit of this: "One of the serious problems in planning against American doctrine is that the Americans do not read their manuals nor do they feel any obligations to follow their doctrine." This emphasizes the importance of the American commander's judgment when applying the doctrine to a particular operational environment in order to accomplish his assigned mission.

The DoD publishes its Joint Doctrine through Joint Publications (JP), the Army publishes their doctrine through Field Manuals (FM), the Marine Corps doctrine can be found in Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP), and the Air Force utilizes Air Force Doctrine Documents (AFDD). Clear guidance states that "joint doctrine takes

precedence over individual Service's doctrine, which must be consistent with joint doctrine" (*JP 1*, 2007:A-1). Where conflicts exist, then the JP takes precedence for joint operations unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues countering orders. No such clear guidance exists when an operation is not addressed in the JP, and the individual services' doctrines conflict with each other. A much more lengthy bureaucratic process is usually required to resolve these issues (*JP 1*, 2007:A-1). The only truly joint guidance for the joint forces commander conducting IW exists in the hastily published *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, officially released on 11 September 2007. This document will also serve as the main planning guidance and reference document for Joint doctrine writers. The main ideas captured in this document can be found in Appendix D.

### ***Joint Warfare***

As indicated earlier, President Eisenhower is credited with the genesis of the basic definition for American Joint Warfare. Inside of the doctrine, the military defines joint as "activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate" (*JP 1-02*, 2007:283). Generically, this means the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines working together. Inside the DoD, often with political assistance or mandating (i.e. Goldwater-Nichols Act), higher level leaders strive to get the separate services to work closely together. Most commonly, joint warfare is described as team warfare. Joint doctrine clearly directs that not all members of the team need to be employed in all situations. Instead, commanders should select those team members that most effectively and efficiently accomplish the assigned mission. Each service has unique capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses. Many times these attributes complement

the other branches. The synergy resulting from truly joint operations greatly exceeds any solo operation by a service (*JP 1*, 2007:I-2).

### ***Levels of War***

In order to clarify the link between national strategic objectives and battlefield actions, three levels of war have been established by DoD: strategic, operational, tactical. No finite limits or boundaries exist between them, and forces or components should not be typically associated with a given level. They are intended to help a commander visualize the logical arrangement of operations, allocate the required resources, and assign appropriate tasks to a given command level. Given the increased communication capability and the global media coverage, any given action can quickly cascade through and create issues at all levels near simultaneously (*JP 3-0*, 2006:II-2). Below the levels are arranged from higher to lower with a brief description derived from the Joint Publications.

- Strategic Level – the level which nations or groups of nations determine overarching objectives and how to use national level assets and resource to achieve those goals. At this level of war, national policy is converted to national strategic objectives, that when combined with doctrine, guide the development of a framework for conducting military operations (*JP 3-0*, 2006:II-1 to II-2).
- Operational Level – the level that designs campaigns and major operations for military forces. Usually involves deployment of forces, commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and attempting to influence an adversary's disposition before combat (*JP 3-0*, 2006:II-2).
- Tactical Level – the level that plans and executes battles, engagements, and activities to accomplish military objectives. Battles are a related set of engagements that involve forces at and below the levels of fleet, army, and air force. Usually, engagements between opposing forces are of a short-duration. Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other in order to accomplish a given military objective (*JP 3-0*, 2006:II-2 to II-3).

### ***Operational Environment***

One of the most critical and difficult components for commanders and military planners to accurately define, and subsequently understand, is their particular operational environment. In all recent revisions of the Joint Publications and the separate services' doctrine, the term *operational environment* has been designated to replace the outdated term *battlespace* (*JP1-0*, 2007:I-6). The operational environment is defined as "a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander" (*JP1-02*, 2007:394). The operational environment has evolved to include the "physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the informational environment. Included within these are the adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation" (*JP 3-0*, 2006:II-19&II-20). In layman's terms, it is any and all internal or external factors that impact on the commander's decision making, the unit's mission execution, or the enemy's mission.

Given the complexity of this concept, often a systems perspective is taken to aid in the understanding of the interrelated sub-systems that are relevant to a joint operation. Often operational environment sub-systems include the factors of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and many others. This includes the "intangible factors such as culture, perceptions, beliefs, and values of adversary, neutral, or friendly political and social systems" (*JP 3-0*, 2006:II-24). Understanding the sub-systems, their interaction with each other, and how the relationships evolve over time will aid in the understanding of how a unit's actions inside the operational environment could

affect other components. It also aids in the identification of the enemy's center of gravity (JP 3-0, 2006:II-21toII-22).

### ***Center of Gravity (COG)***

The theory of a military center of gravity comes from “what Clausewitz called the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends...the point at which all our energies should be directed” (JP3-0, 2006:IV-9toIV-10). Each member of the operational environment has only one COG per level of the war, but it is dynamic since for a variety of reasons it can change during the course of a conflict. Identification of the COG results from the examination of the relationships between adversaries and must never be considered in a vacuum – isolated from the strategic or operational effects of the operational environment. The “COG compromises the source of power that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and will to fight” (JP3-0, 2006:IV-10). Success in all wars results from being able to neutralize, weaken, or destroy an adversary’s COG through the right methods synchronized in time, space, and purpose, and simultaneously, protecting your COG from attack. While identification often takes place in the adversarial context of a conflict, the effects of the entire operational environment must not be overlooked (JP3-0, 2006:IV-10).

Generically, most recent publications propose that irregular warfare is thought to have a COG of the support of the population; better known as the *hearts and minds* approach. The competing philosophy holds the enemy is the COG, just like conventional warfare; better known as the *coercion* approach. These different approaches are further examined in a subsequent section of this study.


### ***Defining Information Operations (IO)***

Recently the importance and emphasis of *information operations* in the authoritative literature and doctrinal revisions has dramatically increased. In the joint publications, *information operations* is defined as:

The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called **IO** (*JP1-02, 2007:261*).

Given the prominent position of the population and its perception in Irregular Warfare, IO has become critical to generating their support through non-violent means. IO has become to be viewed as the one thing that can fuses the rest of military operations together and ensures they are focused on achieving the final objective; as demonstrated by Figure 1.

**Figure 1: The Strengthening Effect of Information Operations  
(FM3-24, 2006:5-6)**



### ***Various Types of Warfare***

Confusion has resulted from the attempts to classify the types of warfare. The following sections outline the official Joint Publication definitions for conventional warfare, unconventional warfare (UW), traditional warfare, and irregular warfare (IW).

From the DoD's perspective traditional warfare and IW focus on the nature of the conflict and the strategy employed by the belligerents to achieve their desired end state.

Conventional and unconventional, however, refer to the forces and weapons that are employed in fighting the conflict. These classifications are not considered mutually exclusive and may all be present in any given conflict. Caution should also be used in assuming that conventional warfare and traditional warfare or unconventional warfare and irregular warfare are naturally paired (*AFDD 2-3, 2007:3*). As the following definitions further explain, both types of forces can be utilized to accomplish the strategies of both types of warfare.

While these classifications seem almost trivial, mistakes can have grave consequences. Failure to recognize the type of warfare your adversary is conducting or misdiagnosing the type of warfare you are trying to conduct holds great risks. In many cases this results in the misapplication of doctrine and, ultimately, defeat. A common example used to highlight this importance references the challenges faced by a very successful baseball team coming to the stadium to find out the opposing team has decided to play football. The rules and objectives of the game are different, the players' skills required do not easily transfer, and the preparation from long practice sessions provides only limited benefits. To complicate matters, the opposition can transition between the types or conduct all of the types in a single given conflict without an advanced warning.

### ***Conventional Warfare***

Conventional warfare refers to a broad spectrum of military operations conducted against an adversary by traditional military or other government security forces (*AFDD 2-3, 2007:2*). Typically excluded from this category are weapons of mass destruction:

nuclear, biological, and chemical munitions. *JP 1-02* in its definition of conventional forces also excludes forces that have been designated as special operations forces (*JP 1-02*, 2007:122). The large majority of the US military forces and weapons fall into the conventional warfare category. These forces and weapons can be used to conduct traditional warfare or IW, or even a mix of both at the same time, depending on the nature of a particular operational environment.

### ***Unconventional Warfare (UW)***

Historically, the United States normally utilizes Special Operations Forces (SOF) to conduct and facilitate conducting unconventional warfare. The DoD defines UW as:

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery (*JP 1-02*, 2007:564).

Unconventional forces can conduct both traditional warfare and IW, or even a mix of the two, depending on the circumstances found in the operational environment and nature of the conflict. The key distinguishing fact is that “indigenous or surrogate forces” conduct the operations with help from the outside. This contrasts with operations classified as multinational, consisting of “two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners” (*JP 1-02*, 2001:359). The definition of multinational operations implies that forces of both nations are fighting side-by-side.

### ***Traditional Warfare***

Authors have used a variety of synonyms for traditional warfare including *symmetrical warfare, regular warfare, high-intensity conflict, conflict between states,*

*large wars, total war, and nation-on-nation war.* This term refers to what most people commonly think of when asked to define *war*. The Department of Defense utilizes the following detailed description.

Traditional war is characterized as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states. This confrontation typically involves small-scale to large-scale, force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities against each other in the air, land, maritime, and space physical domains and the information environment. The objective is to defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary's government or policies. Military operations in traditional war normally focus on an adversary's armed forces to ultimately influence the adversary's government. It generally assumes that the people indigenous to the operational area are nonbelligerent and will accept whatever political outcome the belligerent governments impose, arbitrate, or negotiate. A fundamental military objective is to minimize civilian interference in those operations. The near-term results of traditional war are often evident, with the conflict ending in victory for one side and defeat for the other or in stalemate (*JP 1*, 2007:I-6).

This type of war characterizes what the American military has excelled in during WWI, WWII, Korea, Panama, Operation DESERT STORM, and the initial stages of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (generally referred to as *Shock and Awe* or *March to Baghdad* campaigns).

### ***Irregular Warfare (IW)***

“What makes IW ‘irregular’ is the focus of its operations – a relevant population – and its strategic purpose – to gain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of that relevant population through political, psychological, and economic methods” (*JP 1*, 2007:I-7). Like traditional warfare, irregular warfare has also been labeled with several different names: *small wars, low intensity conflict, asymmetrical warfare,*

*guerilla warfare, rebellion, police action, people's war, revolutionary warfare, protracted struggle, civil wars, long wars, internal war, and military operations other than war (MOOTW).* Ironically, this low-intensity conflict has occurred more often in history than the traditional nation-on-nation conflict previously described. What was traditionally described by the recognized government of a nation as a rebel, criminal, or bandit is now better defined as combatant on the irregular battlefield (Nagl, 2005:13).


The DoD formally defines IW as:

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, through it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will (*IW JOC*, 2007:6).

The destruction of the adversary's forces or control of specific territory becomes secondary to gaining the support and control of the population.

While Irregular Warfare occurs in many different operational environments, generally, these conditions can be categorized into one of the three sets: failed, cooperative, or non-cooperative states. Under these general environments, the mission of IW becomes to support or target state and non-state actors. Once determined and understood, leaders and planners can develop a more comprehensive strategy to achieve their overall objective. Figure 2 depicts these general environments and the typical specific operations that are assigned in that environment.

**Figure 2: Irregular Warfare General Operating Environments**  
 (AFDD 2-3: 2007:51)




Recently, the DoD has attempted to counter the perception that IW is a lesser form of warfare compared to traditional warfare. Since 9/11, irregular warfare has been expanded to encompass: insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism (*IW JOC*, 2007:6). The DoD is attempting to emphasize that IW requires a different mindset, capabilities, and doctrine than conventional warfare that focuses on defeating an opponent militarily. Each belligerent (whether states or other armed groups) has the following goals of their operations:


- Bolster the population's perception of their side's legitimacy and credibility.
- Seek to erode the perception of their opponent's legitimacy and credibility.
- Isolate, physically and psychologically, their antagonist from the target population. (*JP 1*, 2007:I-6 to I-7)

Figure 3 highlights the contrasting focuses between traditional warfare and irregular warfare in relation to the Clausewitzian Trinity, and Figure 4 depicts the nuances of Irregular Warfare in terms of actors, methods, and strategic purposes.

**Figure 3: Contrasting Traditional and Irregular Warfare (IW JOC, 2007:8)**



**Figure 4: Describing Irregular Warfare (AFDD 2-3, 2007:4)**



#### *Differences between the Insurgent and Counterinsurgent*

Typically, the counterinsurgent represents the more powerful armed forces of the nation's established regime or external forces deployed to the region in order to provide support to the recognized government. The insurgent is the less powerful adversary attempting to wrestle control away from the controlling or recognized regime (*JP 1, 2007:I-6*). Simply put, the insurgent attempts to create chaos and disorder in order to seize power from the ruling party, and the counterinsurgent struggles to keep order and maintain the legitimacy of the government (Galula, 2006:6-7). The unattributed quote,

“One man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist,” indicates the problems and connotations that have been connected with these terms. The insurgent will describe himself using more romantic descriptions like *freedom fighter, partisan, patriot, revolutionary, resistance fighter, and rebel*. The counterinsurgent will describe his enemy as *terrorists, bandits, criminals and thugs, enemies of the state, extortionists, and outlaws*. The connotations of these terms prove extremely important as the belligerents portray themselves, or even their opponents, in their propaganda material or when dealing with the media. Since the population is the focus of IW operations, the manipulation of their perceptions can prove critical to achieving victory

### **The Foundations for Irregular Warfare Doctrine**

#### ***Distinguishing Between the Sides of Irregular Warfare***

A direct cause/effect relationship exists: the counterinsurgency is a response to the insurgency. Counterinsurgents and their operations are best defined by referencing their foes. The insurgency begins to form long before the insurgent resorts to the use of force or violence erupts. Unlike conventional warfare, only one side can initiate the violent portion of the conflict – the insurgent. “Paraphrasing Clausewitz, we might say that ‘Insurgency is the pursuit of the policy of a party, inside a country, by every means.’ It is not like an ordinary war – ‘a continuation of the policy by other means’” (Galula, 2006:1). Since the objective of the conflict is winning the support of the population, or at least gaining their acceptance, politics becomes an active instrument and remains foremost throughout the war. Every military and political action has to be weighed with regard to its effect on the other. These two elements prove to be intricately tied together throughout the conflict (Galula, 2006:5). The fundamental difference between the

insurgents and the counterinsurgents according to David Galula are best captured by Figure 5 originally found in Robert Tomes' article, "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare."

**Figure 5: Summary of the Differences Between  
The Insurgent and the Counterinsurgent (Tomes, 2004:21)**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Insurgent</b>	<b>Counterinsurgent</b>
Resource Asymmetry	Limited Resource / Power	Preponderance of Resources / Power
Objective = Population	Solicit government oppression	Show that insurgency is destabilizing
Political Nature of War	Wage war for the minds of population	Wage war for the same, and to keep legitimacy
Gradual Transition to War	Use time to develop cause	Always in reactive mode
Protracted nature of war	Disperse; use limited violence widely	Maintain vigilance; sustain will
Cost	High return for investment	Sustained operations carry high political/economic burden
Role of Ideology	Sole asset at beginning is cause or idea	Defeat root of cause or idea

### *Distinguishing Between the Common COIN Approaches*

Two distinct Counterinsurgency approaches have emerged from historical trial and error: *Hearts and Minds* and *Coercion*. The *Hearts and Minds* Approach recognizes the fundamental change inherent in the nature of irregular warfare and attacks the population's support of the insurgents. When required, counterinsurgents continuing to attack the insurgents' armed elements, but they also engage in a more robust campaign – including information operations, civil affairs, and reconstruction – that directly targets the population's perceptions of the government's legitimacy. In effect, *hearts and minds* attempts to separate the insurgent from the population, and without that support, the insurgency will perish as the government's legitimacy is no longer questioned (Nagl, 2005:28).

The *Coercion* approach, however, contends that the defeat an insurgency results from defeating his armed elements. In essence it mimics the goals of traditional warfare. The line between the insurgent and the supporting population are intentionally blurred; killing, intentionally or unintentionally, an indirect supporter of an insurgency should coerce the rest of the population to avoid such actions. If no clear distinction exists, then killing large amounts of the population is a justifiable method to suppress a rebellion that has proven to work in the past: the Roman Empire, Saddam Hussein against the Kurds, the Germans during WWII, and King William II against the Welsh (Nagl, 2005:26-28).

Distinguishing between the two techniques, a senior US Special Forces Officer once offered the following paraphrased example when discussing COIN with some junior Army Captains:

From the way I see it, you have a couple of options. You can be like the Russians in Afghanistan – killing as many people as you must or can at first and then try to co-opt the rest of the populace. Or you can follow a different example – co-opt as many people as you can and then kill those that are unreachable. Let's face it, some people, due to any number of reasons, will never respond to your best efforts to reason with them, bribe them, or motivate them to join your side. That very small percentage will require the use of a bullet.

While the *coercion* approach has proven successful against many insurgencies, the *hearts and minds* approach has proven to have much longer lasting effect. Additionally most liberal, western democracies have concluded that the *coercion* is not an acceptable means to conduct counterinsurgency given their values and norms (Nagl, 2005:27).

### ***Insurgency Motivation and Goals***

“No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to

conduct it” (Clausewitz, 1976:579). Since the counterinsurgency originates as a response to its enemy, defining the type of insurgency faced becomes critical to understanding what needs to be achieved or how best to reach those objectives. A U.S. Army Special Forces Officer once summarized this by stating, “You have to figure out what people are so pissed off about and why that grievance is not being addressed inside of the existing political system.” Failing to understand the fundamental goals of an insurgency could prove to be catastrophic for the counterinsurgent. He could be wasting resources trying to correct the wrong problem, or worse, the counterinsurgent might even be contributing unintentionally to the problem.

Properly diagnosing the type of insurgency also become critical when considering providing external support. Faced with a long struggle against governmental forces with superior training, weapons, and capabilities, the insurgents often look for assistance from an external partner. This has been facilitated by the regional/global aspect of many economies, the huge leaps in communication technology, and the proliferation of arms available on the global black market (O’Neill, 2005:139-140). External agencies supporting insurgents may face unintended and unforeseen consequences. The US has learned this first hand after the insurgents they supported against the Russians in Afghanistan morphed into the Taliban that they later fought in response to the 9/11 attacks. The US supporting Iraq in their war against Iran also contributed to Iraq’s ability to later pose a large enough threat to the region to spark two wars against the Saddam regime. External agencies are faced with a great challenge of attempting to determine: if the insurgent’s public claims match their true motivation and goals; does victory for the

insurgents match/support their future national interests; and will support cause issues with other foreign policy objectives (O'Neill, 2005:148-151).

Bard O'Neill in his book, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, identifies nine distinct classifications of insurgencies based on their goals. Each type of insurgency has distinct characteristics, weaknesses, and goals, that once understood, can be exploited by the counterinsurgent.

1. Anarchist – removal of all authority patterns; they should be destroyed and not replaced. Examples include the Black Cells in Germany in the 1970s (O'Neill, 2005:20).
2. Egalitarian – desire to establish a new governmental structure based on the equal distribution of wealth and to radically transform the social structure within a political community. During the Cold War, these were most often referred to as Communist-Marxist (i.e. Vietcong in South Vietnam), but the Baathist groups that gained power in Iraq also fall into this category (O'Neill, 2005:20-21).
3. Traditionalist – seek to establish a regime based on ancestral ties or religious values. Typically they want to empower an autocratic leader supported by elites in economic, military, or clerical arenas, but do not desire widespread participation by the masses. The numerous Jihadist organizations based in the Middle East are not the only examples of this category. The Contras in Nicaragua in the 1980s, the Aryan Nation, and the *Jewish Underground* in Israel also have these characteristics (O'Neill, 2005:21-23).
4. Apocalyptic-Utopian – create an apocalypse like condition, often through terrorism, in order to establish a new world order, usually through some divine intervention. Typically described as religious cults with political goals. Examples include Aum Shinrikyo in Japan and Mahdaviyat in Iran (O'Neill, 2005:23-24).
5. Pluralist – envisage a government based on the typical Western values of personal liberty through a compromise to protect minority rights under majority rule. The most common example is the French Revolution; more recently the Anti-Apartheid movement of South Africa serves as an example (O'Neill, 2005:24).
6. Secessionist – desire to divorce a geographic area from a controlling government in order to become independent or to join another state. The

Confederates during the American Civil War, the Irish Republican Army in the six counties under British rule, the Kurd rebels in the Middle East, and Chechen groups in Russia fit this category (O'Neill, 2005:24-26).

7. Reformist – seek to change policies that have created perceived victims of deprivation and discrimination. Most of these policies focus on the distribution of economic, psychological, or political benefits or rights. The Sudan Liberation Army in Darfur and Zapatistas in Mexico are examples of these groups (O'Neill:2005, 26-27).
8. Preservationist – target with violence non-ruling groups that are striving for change in order to preserve the status quo and maintain their elevated position of privilege. The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in the United States, the Afrikaner Resistance Movement during South African apartheid, or the Latin American *death squads* serves as a good example. Excluded from this category are organizations sanctioned by the ruling government, like the Saddam Fedayeen during Saddam Hussein's rule of Iraq, because they are viewed as state agents (O'Neill, 2005:27-28).
9. Commercialist – motivated by greed and power lust, these groups attempt to seize and control political power in order to further their acquisition of wealth. The most notable example of this type is the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone (O'Neill, 2005:28-29).

### ***Issues Clearly Defining an Insurgency***

As with all categorical breakdowns, there exist issues in getting reality to fit neatly into one of the designated bins. Focusing on the goals of the insurgency remains the critical aspect of the endeavor. This facilitates a better understanding of the insurgents' acceptable methods, resource demands, necessary support level from the population, and most critically, identifies inherent vulnerabilities of the movement that the counterinsurgent can exploit (O'Neill, 2005:31-32). In other words, it provides the counterinsurgent an insight into determining the insurgency's center of gravity; that point which the counterinsurgent's efforts should be focused on defeating. The most common obstacles to a correct identification by the counterinsurgent are:

1. Changing Goals – like all learning organizations, the insurgents will react to changes in their situation, the operational environment, or the counterinsurgents' relative strength. This includes evaluating and changing their goals to increase the probability of success or to prevent complete failure.
2. Conflicting Goals – most insurgent organizations are really *groups of groups*. They are united by a shared interest or common enemy, but may have disagreement on intermediate goals or even the ultimate objective. This makes it difficult to pinpoint one main goal for the larger organization.
3. Misleading Rhetoric – external propaganda intended to garner support for the cause might not reveal the true goal of the insurgency group.
4. Ambiguous Goals – the existence of multiple goals, without a predominant one, could cause for the classification into more than one category.
5. Confusion of Ultimate and Intermediate Goals – this most commonly results from the fact that most of the categories ultimately call for the establishment of a new government system and to achieve that goal, usually they have to destroy the existing authority. Failure to consider their desired end state might mistakenly cause the classification of the group into Anarchist group (O'Neill, 2005: 29-31).

### ***Mao's Contributions to Insurgency***

Since the days of the Greeks battling the Persians as historically captured in the writings of Thucydides, the basics of irregular warfare have changed very little. The weaker force masterfully uses the terrain to disguise his forces in order to apply his strength against his enemy's exposed weakness. Battling on equal terms in a conventional manner must be avoided, unless victory is absolutely certain, in order to preserve combat power. Mao Tse-Tung mastered these techniques during the struggles against the Japanese occupation of China (1937-1945) and leading the Chinese Communist Revolution (1926-1936 & 1945-1949). From these long periods of resistance, Mao developed his doctrine that has now become known as the *People's Protracted War* (Nagl, 2005:23).

Mao's theory for a protracted war is characterized by three overlapping fluid phases. Progressing from one phase to another does not preclude an insurgency from returning to that phase if the situation changed or did not occur as planned. In many cases, the phases will exist simultaneously in different geographic locations of the same country, nation, or region. The *strategic defense* prescribed that the insurgents would concentrate on gathering popular support, low-level violence only for easy, lucrative targets, and mere survival. The *strategic stalemate* is characterized by mainly guerilla warfare focusing on eroding the government's legitimacy and power while attempting to continue the husbandry of his forces. The *strategic offensive* has the insurgents graduating from guerilla warfare to conventional attacks to complete the collapse of the government (Mao, 1966:210-219).

Lacking the logistical support of an established government, the insurgent forces must rely on the population to sustain and build their army. Without this material support, the insurgency will surely die: slowly fading because a lack of popular interest or rapidly from an inability to recover from an engagement with the government. Emphasizing the importance of the people to an insurgency, Mao contends that “the riches source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people” (Mao, 1966:260). To maintain this close relationship with his critical support base, Mao instituted a series of prescriptive guidance for his forces when dealing with the population:

**The Rules:**

1. All actions are subject to command.
2. Do not steal from the people.
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.

**Remarks:**

1. Replace the door when you leave the house.
2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.

3. Be courteous.
4. Be honest in your transactions.
5. Return what you borrow.
6. Replace what you break.
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women.
8. Do not without authority search those you arrest (Mao, 1961:92).

In truth, Mao Tse-Tung knew the people were much more important to his revolution than just materials. Mao's greatest contribution to the irregular warfare formula has been the marriage of the military actions with the revolutionary politics aimed at garnering support from the population (Nagl, 2005:23). Mao captures this significance in his statement, "Without a political goal, guerilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained" (Mao, 1961:43). Due to strong political motivation, the poor and suffering Chinese peasants sustained and supported Mao's forces through twenty-three years of prolonged conflict against his more powerful enemies.

This question of the political mobilization of the army and the people is indeed of the greatest importance. We have dwelt on it at the risk of repetition precisely because victory is impossible without it. There are, of course, many other conditions indispensable to victory, but political mobilization is the most fundamental (Mao, 1966:261).

This basic doctrine and campaign structure has been observed by most modern insurgencies. Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, the Sandinistas, the PLO in their continuing struggle against Israel, and even the transnational group, Al-Qaeda utilize Mao's teachings as their foundations. Each insurgency has made modification based on their particular situation, goals, relative strength, culture, and surrounding terrain, but historical examination easily reveals Mao's fundamentals. Although not as solidly

proven, the enemies confronting the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq show indicators of adopting Mao's principles to match the unique characteristics of their operational environment (Hammes, 2004:207-208).

### ***Che Guevara's Lost Influence***

Once considered an intellectual or philosophical leader of leftist political activists and insurgents, Che Guevara's contributions are now considered mainly symbolic. His famous image adorns T-shirts, placards, banners, watches, and murals still being produced throughout Cuba, Mexico, and other parts of Latin America. Contemporary popular imagination is still captured by this man who ultimately died championing the underclass and trying to encourage people to place the broader societal needs over their narrow personal ones through a Marxist insurrection. While his book, *Guerrilla Warfare*, still has great academic value, its contemporary contribution is considered more historical than as doctrinal manual or guide for contemporary insurgents to follow (Guevara, 1998:v-vi).

Che Guevara masterfully weaves the theories of Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-Tung, and Ho Chi Minh into his strategic and tactical guidance for conducting guerilla warfare (Guevara, 1998:11,107,154-158). He mentions the importance of intelligence and propaganda in sustaining the guerilla movement (Guevara, 1998:104-108). Echoing other irregular warfare material, Che Guevara concludes that the struggle is a means to accomplish "the conquest of political power" (Guevara, 1998:142). His later works praises the strength of the Vietnamese peasants being displayed by enduring "the furious attacks of U.S. technology, with practically no possibility of reprisals in the South and only some of defense in the North – but always alone" (Guevara, 1998:164).

The validity of Che Guevara's primary theoretical tenets, however, has failed to be historically proven in subsequent operations. In what has been labeled as *foco theory*, Che Guevara proposes three lessons from the Cuban Revolution as new fundamental laws for future revolutions and believed that these fundamentals would lead to assured success in future rebellions in the Americas.

1. Popular forces can win a war against the army.
2. It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.
3. In underdeveloped America, the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting (Guevara, 1998:7).

His first point simply reaffirms the power of guerilla warfare when supported by the masses and can likely be traced back to Mao's influence. His second point, however, no longer requires the building of a proletariat in accordance with conventional Marxist revolutionary theory. Che Guevara advocates immediate action over an overly patient approach for irregular warfare. A group of guerilla *foco*, or leaders, should overtly challenge the government's legitimacy and right to rule. This challenge elicits an extreme, and often very violent, response from the government. Historically in Latin America, this governmental crack-down focused disproportionately on the agrarian populace, and the subsequent reaction cemented the peasant's opposition to the *oppressive government*. This validates Che Guevara's third point and highlights why he advocated agrarian reform as essential to the revolution's political message and generating popular support (Johnson, 2006:27).

Despite great success in Cuba, Che Guevara failed in Bolivia and many guerillas in Central America, Peru, and Colombia have abandoned his violent methods for actions

in the political arena (Guevara, 1998:v). Che Guevara has been criticized for failing to consider the effects of the entire operational environment on setting the necessary conditions for successful application of his *foco theory*. While his first and third points may prove true depending on the external factors. His second point, revolutionary conditions can be created, however, proved to be false. Simple labeling a government as *oppressive* and challenging its legitimacy does not guarantee the requisite extremely violent response aimed at the peasantry. In fact, a responsive political system or effective COIN strategy easily defuses the revolution's main weapon to generate the support of the population for their cause (Johnson 2006:31). Thus, Che Guevara's work has been relegated mainly to historical importance and has lost much of its authoritative status in irregular warfare theory.

While not valuable for starting a contemporary revolution, Che Guevara's technique has been adopted by many modern insurgencies as a means to expand the gap between the government and the populace. Ironically, this technique has proven far more effective in the urban areas more than the rural ones. Given the close proximity of the insurgent to the populace, any counterinsurgent reaction will have a much higher chance of affecting the innocent civilians. Provoking this violent response by the counterinsurgents when combined with a strong propaganda campaign can portray the government as oppressive toward all of its population. Unintended consequences, such as the death of a child, could also easily sway the fence-sitters and their families to support the insurgency. This further complicates the complex operational environment for the counterinsurgent forces and leaders.

***Al-Qaeda Training Manual (a.k.a. Manchester Manual)***

Since being found during a May 2000 search of an Al-Qaeda member's house in Manchester, England, the *Al-Qaeda Training Manual* (as later titled by the United States' Federal Bureau of Investigation) has provided analysts a valuable insight into the organization's beliefs and practices. In its opening presentation it calls for terrorism and violence to achieve success:

The confrontation that we are calling for with the apostate regimes does not know Socratic debate..., Platonic ideals..., no Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine gun.

Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they [always] have been by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth (*AQTM*, 2004:13).

The document, however, proves to be much more than a tradecraft manual providing detailed instructions in simple terms on how to secretly conduct covert communications, assassinations, espionage, and how to act if detained. Using elaborate justification based on Koran passages or quotes from Muslim leaders, this manual also provides inspiration to the Al-Qaeda undercover member. These are especially useful in convincing the young members that the acts of violence confirm with recognized religious authority (*AQTM*, 2004:ix-x).

Many of the insurgents found in Iraq and Afghanistan have adopted several of the fundamentals proposed by *Al-Qaeda Training Manual*. Members have proven to possess the ability to *observe and analyze* in order to learn the measures taken by the enemy or to identify mistakes by fellow members. In subsequent operations, members are expected to adapt their actions to counter these mistakes in order to be successful in future operations

(*AQTM*, 2004:31&134). To sustain the organization, the manual has several instructions about secrecy and safety to prevent the entire network from crumbling with the capture of one individual (*AQTM*, 2004:57-60). In Iraq, Afghanistan, and even at the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility, detainees have acted in accordance with the lessons on *Interrogation and Investigation* and *Prisons and Detention Centers* found in Chapters 17 and 18 of the manual (Simmons, 2007). The fundamental principles for executing ambushes, IED attacks, and political assassinations, which are all common weapons for the insurgents, can also be referenced inside the *Al-Qaeda Training Manual*.

Although the true publication date and author are unknown, the impact of the *Al-Qaeda Training Manual* has been observed in theaters the United States is currently conducting COIN operations. Even though the extent of the Al-Qaeda network and its loosely affiliated associates are not definitively identified, the use of its doctrinal principles provide strong support for the truly international nature of the terrorist and insurgent organizations the United States can expect to face in the future conflicts when defending its national interests. Given the ease of communication over the global internet, this transnational effect is easily understandable.

#### ***USMC 1940 Small Wars Manual***

Even as late as 1987, the *USMC Small Wars Manual* was considered to be one of the best doctrinal foundations for irregular warfare, peacekeeping, and stability operations (USMC, 1940:fwd). The early chapters of the manual were viewed as “an unparalleled exposition of the theory of small wars” (Boot, 2002:284); even after the publication of FM 3-24 in 2006, some experts still preferred the *Small Wars Manual* as guidance for leaders at the tactical level of war. Despite now-archaic instructions and

pictures on the proper loading of pack mules, this classic military manual provides guidance and insights for contemporary warriors currently engaged in irregular wars. This historical approach to conducting low-intensity conflicts captures the lessons and the methods utilized by the Marine Corps during the early years of the twentieth century, when they were often referred to as “State Department troops” (Boot, 2002:283).

Despite its early publication date, this manual continues to be placed on several contemporary reading lists for students and military officers studying IW. Its fifteen chapters cover almost all of the topics still applicable to modern irregular warfare: Unique Characteristics of IW, Appropriate Organization of Forces, Logistics, Training, Entry Operations, Patrolling (dismounted and mounted), Aviation, Disarming the Populace, Arming Native Organizations, Military Government, Supervision of Elections, and Withdrawal. Examinations of later IW publications, civilian and military, prove that many of the *Small Wars Manual*’s key points have been incorporated by contemporary authors. This is especially true of the FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* and AFDD 2-3 *Irregular Warfare*; in fact, the 1940 edition of the *Small Wars Manual* can be found in their suggested reading list (AFDD2-3, 2007:77) or annotated bibliography (FM3-24, 2006:AB-2).

Unfortunately, the 1940 edition of the *Small Wars Manual* was published at the most inopportune time, just before the start of World War II. Historically, the period of 1939-1945 saw significant guerilla operations in Yugoslavia, France, North Africa, Philippines, and Germany, but these operations are often completely overshadowed by the clash of the large armies in Europe and the Pacific. The American military spent great resources gathering, capturing, and publishing the lessons learned from the

conventional warfare in World War II, but the *Small Wars Manual* and its lessons had been forgotten by the time the United States fought its next small war in Vietnam (Boot, 2002:283-285).

In hindsight, the *Small Wars Manual* highlights several of the potential pitfalls that have plagued the United States' most recent foray into irregular warfare campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Admittedly, it is difficult to identify when an insurgency begins, but if this manual had been consulted, its historical lessons may have helped the modern leaders of the Army and the Marine Corps as they found themselves fighting a counterinsurgency. The following excerpts are provided to highlight this manual's identification of the issues that still plagued modern conflicts. As the popular quote from George Santayna notes: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Santayna, 1905:284).

- "The campaign plan and strategy must be adapted to the character of the people encountered....Strategy should attempt to gain psychological ascendancy over the outlaw or insurgent element prior to hostilities. Remembering the political mission which dictates the strategy of small wars...." (USMC, 1940:Chap 1, pg 13).
- "The application of purely military measures may not, by itself restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political, or social. These conditions may have originated years ago and in many cases have been permitted to develop freely without any attempt to apply corrective measures" (USMC, 1940:Chap 1, pg 15).
- "While the peasant hopes for the restoration of peace and order, the constant menace and fear of guerillas is so overpowering that he does not dare to place any confidence in an occasional visiting patrol of the occupying forces" (USMC, 1940:Chap1, pg 25).
- "One of the principle obstacles with which the naval forces are confronted in small war situation is the one that has to do with the absence of a clean-cut line of demarcation between State Department authority and military authority....There

are no define principles of ‘Joint Action’ between the State Department and the Navy Department....” (USMC, 1940:Chap 1, pg 33).

- “The satisfactory solution of problems involving civil authorities and civil populations requires that all ranks be familiar with the language, the geography, and the political, social, and economic factors involved in the country in which they are operating” (USMC, 1940:Chap1, pg 41).
- “In small wars, the normal separation of units, both in garrison as well as in the field, requires that all military qualities be well developed in both the individual and the unit. Particular attention should be paid to the development of initiative, adaptability, leadership, teamwork, and tactical proficiency of individuals composing the various units” (USMC, 1940:Chap 4, pg 3).
- “The intervening force must resort to typical small war operations, with numerous infantry patrols and outposts dispersed over a wide area, in order to afford the maximum protection of the peaceful inhabitants of the country and to seek out and destroy the hostile groups” (USMC, 1940:Chap 6, pg 1).
- “The employment of aviation in small wars is characterized by the operation of many small units, two or three planes patrols, over a wide area. Normal scouting missions will in most cases be modified to search attacks, performed by airplanes of the scouting or observation class armed with light bombs and machine guns” (USMC, 1940:Chap 9, pg 1).

As mentioned before, unfortunately, many of these lessons were forgotten before the war in Vietnam and more crucially, after the American military tried to divorce itself from COIN after its lack of the success in the Vietnam War.

### ***David Galula’s Insights***

David Galula’s 106 page book from 1964, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, can be found atop most of the *COIN Reading Lists* that have become abundantly popular in recent months. In the forward to the original publication, Bernard Fall called Galula’s work the best *how-to* guide for COIN (Tomes, 2004:20). In the forward to the later version, LTC John Nagl believes “it is hard to find any book whose lessons can be more profitably learned by those who may have to follow Galula down the

streets without joy of counterinsurgency” (Galula, 2006:x). Galula believes that war for the counterinsurgent is simple, “Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward” (Galula, 2006:95). The political aspect must be primary when compared to the military portion of a successful counterinsurgency campaign; therefore propaganda becomes an essential weapon in the fight for the population’s support (Galula, 2006:5).

Galula offers four generic courses of action for the counterinsurgent before violence begins to become wide spread; they should not be considered mutually exclusive of each other.

1. Focus directly on the insurgent leaders.
2. Act indirectly on the conditions favoring the insurgency.
3. Attempt to infiltrate the insurgency attempting to make it ineffective.
4. Mobilize his political elements in order to gain more support for the regime.

In executing these four courses of action, the counterinsurgent also has the challenge to convince the population that the sacrifices and vast amounts of resources expended to defeat the insurgency are justified by the legitimate threat to the nation’s security (Galula, 2006:44).

After the conflict becomes violent, Galula offers four laws for the counterinsurgent in order to achieve success:

1. Like the insurgent, the counterinsurgent also needs the support of the population in order to conduct operations.
2. Support is gained by mobilizing an active minority to help sway the neutral majority toward his side.

3. Population support is conditional, based on demonstrated will, means, ability to win, and successes achieved.
4. The intensive concentration of efforts, resource, and personnel must be applied successively area by area, not diluted all over the country; must have the will to sustain this for a long duration (Galula, 2006:51-60).

While these laws are simply stated, they prove increasing difficult to execute in reality.

In his experience most problems occur during the transition from an overarching strategy to tactical execution (Galula, 2006:60). To help overcome these hurdles, Galula offers a set of steps to be followed as the counterinsurgent begins operations inside of a given area:

1. Destroy or expel the insurgent combat forces.
2. Deploy a static security force.
3. Establish contact with the population and begin to exert his control over them.
4. Destroy or capture the insurgent's political element.
5. Conduct local elections.
6. Test the locally elected officials.
7. Organize the party.
8. Win over or suppress the remnants of the guerillas (Galula, 2006:61-74).

These steps provide the operational and tactical leader the insight to transform strategy into actions at their level.

The strength of Galula's book comes from his ability to span all levels of war, strategic, operational, and tactical. For today's operational environment, its largest weakness results from its focus solely on a nation based insurgency. His lessons require

a great deal of modification or interpretation when looking at the contemporary threat of a global or transnational insurgency.

### ***Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife***

The British campaign against the Communist insurgents during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) has been heralded as the benchmark for successful COIN operations in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. The American efforts in Vietnam (1950-1972), however, have equally been deemed a failure in COIN operations (Nagl, 2005:xxii). In *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, LTC John Nagl's compared the British Army and the American Army during these conflicts and gained many insights that, as one of the primary authors, he incorporated throughout *FM 3-24*.

LTC Nagl concludes that the British achieved more success because of their organizational learning process. The challenges of fighting an insurgent war with conventional warfare doctrine were neutralized through significant innovation of the British tactics and strategy. All units adopted more effective tactics that focused on building the support of the people instead of destroying the enemy. Senior leaders emphasized the strategic link between the political and military goals for all operations. The military fostered rapid development, implementation, and dissemination of more effective COIN doctrine. Junior leaders observed the tangible results of this new doctrine and inspired them to continue the learning process. The one key variable that seems hardest to replicate, especially when countries support the COIN efforts of another nation, is the British public's long-term patience, acceptance, and support as the military fought a limited war to achieve limited objectives. After more than ten years of fighting,

the freely elected government of Malaya declared the emergency over in 1960 (Nagl, 2005:59).

The American involvement in the Vietnam War proves to be the antithesis to the British in Malaya. With a doctrine best suited for conventional warfare, the US Army attempted to counter the insurgents of Vietnam. The Army failed to adapt to its operational environment despite input from its own officers, the United States Marine Corps, and the British Advisory Mission – attempting to impart their lessons from the Malayan Emergency. They disregarded the tenet of COIN of separating the insurgent from his popular support. Instead, the Army followed its traditional focus of destroying the enemy forces, but leaders failed to realize the enemy proved difficult to find and distinguish from the population. Reliant on firepower and technological superiority, the Army continued its annihilation approach with an almost complete disregard to the political element and the necessity to build the legitimacy of the government of the Republic of South Vietnam (Nagl, 2005:115). Institutional learning was also retarded by the conventionally bred generals that failed to encourage innovated ways to win wars. In many cases, these senior leaders discouraged or punished any innovation by their subordinates. LTC Nagl believes:

The history of the U.S. Army in Vietnam can be seen as the history of individuals attempting to implement changes in counterinsurgency doctrine but failing to overcome a very strong organizational culture predisposed to a conventional attrition-based doctrine (Nagl, 2005:116).

From this historical examination, LTC Nagl concludes that militaries must institutionalize the ability to rapidly learn and adapt during the conflict in order to be successful in COIN operations. The operational environment will dictate that

counterinsurgent forces will have to confront messy, uncomfortable situations as the enemy attempts to maximize his asymmetric advantage. Without an organizational culture that embraces learning and adapting, armies will only find failure in future COIN operations and repeat the mistakes of the America in Vietnam (Nagl, 2005:223).

While LTC Nagl focuses on the actions of the British and American militaries in their theaters of operation, he fails to consider the external influences on their overall operations. Specifically, he does not address the home-front popular support that the British forces enjoyed and the lack of it that plagued the American efforts. The close proximity to World War II and the imperial history of the British culture might explain their greater tolerance to the long duration of the Malayan Emergency. The stalemate achieved during the fighting in Korea, the lack of a direct link to the national survival of the US, and the required conscription to generate the forces highlights some potential cause of the lack of popular support for America's efforts in Vietnam. Improvements in media technology also brought the *horrors of war* into the living rooms of American families on a daily basis. Lacking the ability, or the initial intent, to build and sustain popular support on the home-front has continued to plague America's irregular warfare efforts. As Kilcullen and Hammes indicate, this may prove to be the US military's center of gravity and potential Achilles Heel as it can easily be attacked by the enemy in a highly integrated, high tech media world.

#### ***COIN Best Practices from Dr. Sepp***

While working as a special advisor on the GEN Casey's Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Staff in Baghdad in summer 2004, Dr. Kalev Sepp wrote the only unclassified annex of an Operations Order focused on defeating the rising insurgent enemy; that

portion was later published by *Military Review* as the article, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency.” After closely examining 17 insurgencies and aspects of 36 other ones, Dr. Sepp discerned a list of the successful and unsuccessful practices in COIN (Sepp, 2005:8). His findings were captured in a chart and have been presented here in Figure 6.

**Figure 6: Successful and Unsuccessful COIN Practices (Sepp, 2005:10)**

<u>Successful</u>	<u>Unsuccessful</u>
Emphasis on intelligence	Primacy of military direction of COIN
Focus on the population, their needs, and security	Priority to <i>kill-capture</i> enemy, not on engaging population
Secure areas established, then expanded	Battalion-size operations as the norm
Insurgents isolated from population (population control)	Military units concentrated on large bases for protection
Single authority (charismatic/dynamic leader)	Special Forces focused on raiding
Effective, pervasive psychological operations (PSYOP) campaigns	Adviser effort a low priority in personnel assignment
Amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents	Building, training indigenous army in image of U.S. Army
Police force expanded, diversified	Peacetime government processes
Conventional military forces reoriented for COIN	Open borders, airspaces, coastlines
Special Forces, advisers embedded with indigenous forces	
Insurgent sanctuaries denied	

#### *Writings of Dr. David Kilcullen*

Dr. David Kicullen served 21 years in the Australian Army’s Infantry achieving the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and serving assignments East Timor, Bougainville, and the Middle East. Since retiring from active duty in 2005, he remains in the Australian Army Reserve and has stayed extremely busy serving as a special adviser for irregular warfare to the US DoD for the *2005 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review*, a Chief Strategist in the US State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and the

senior COIN advisor to GEN David Petraeus in Iraq (“Bio,” 2008). He has also conducted colloquiums and briefings at the US Army Armor School, the USMC’s Small Wars Center of Excellence, and many other elements of the Department of the Defense.

Given this resume, when publically introduced, he is often referred titled as *a leading contemporary theorist and practitioner of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism*. His key publications are briefly summarized below:

- “Countering Global Insurgency” – The US Global War on Terrorism is actually a campaign to counter a global Islamist insurgency. Most Western COIN doctrine is focused on operations in a single country and thus, woefully inadequate to counter a truly global threat. Given the characteristics of the global enemy, Complexity, an emerging science for complex system analysis, is required to correctly mentally model the threat. Complexity shows that the system’s links, not the actual nodes, provide the most dangerous characteristics of the global insurgents. Instead of attempting to destroy every insurgent (or node), an attempt to disaggregate (or preventing them from functioning as a global system) is a more appropriate option. This focus implies a new and different strategy combining a wider range of policy options (Kilcullen, 2005:2).
- “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency” – a tactical guide for Company-grade leaders that translates COIN theory into techniques and procedures that will help them cope with challenges of an extremely adaptive enemy. Kilcullen cautions that despite the commandment-like presentation, readers must apply the lessons judiciously and skeptically. (Kilcullen, 2006b:103).
- “Counterinsurgency *Redux*” – The term *counterinsurgency* was invented to describe the theory utilized in countering the wars of national liberation from 1944 to 1982 (Kilcullen, 2006a:1). Contemporary insurgents do not comply with the model or the assumptions that these theories were based upon, and thus, require some new paradigms to augment the classical ones in order for the counterinsurgent to be successful (Kilcullen, 2006a:11). These proposed new paradigms for modern counterinsurgency are:
  1. The side may win which best mobilizes and energizes its global, regional and local support base – and prevents it adversaries doing likewise (Kilcullen, 2006a:9).

- 2. The security force *area of influence* may need to include all neighboring countries, and its *area of interest* may need to be global (Kilcullen, 2006a:9).
- 3. The security force must control a complex *conflict ecosystem* – rather than defeating a single specific insurgent adversary (Kilcullen, 2006a:9).
- 4. A common diagnosis of the problem, and enablers for collaboration, may matter more than formal unity of effort across multiple agencies (Kilcullen, 2006a:10).
- 5. Modern counterinsurgency may be 100% political – comprehensive media coverage making even the most straightforward combat action a *political warfare engagement* (Kilcullen, 2006a:10).
- 6. *Victory* may not be final – *permanent containment* may be needed to prevent defeated insurgents transforming into terrorist groups (Kilcullen, 2006a:10).
- 7. Secret intelligence may matter less than situational awareness based on unclassified but difficult-to-access information (Kilcullen, 2006a:11).
- “Political Maneuver in Counterinsurgency: Road-Building in Afghanistan” – Following the example of the Romans, counterinsurgents have often used road-building for “projecting military force, extending governance and rule of law, enhancing political communication and bringing economic development, health and education to the population” (Kilcullen, 2008). Using his field notes from his visit to the Kunar Road project in Afghanistan, Kilcullen notes that the road construction project has produced political, security, and economic benefits across the tactical, operation, and strategic levels. To replicate this in other locations, counterinsurgents must fully understand their operational environment and political maneuver as a COIN technique. A political maneuver utilizes non-military COIN tools to accomplish a goal. The Kunar Road project proves to be “a coordinated civil-military activity based on a political strategy of separating the insurgent from the people and connecting the people to the government. In short, this is a political maneuver with a road as a means to a political end” (Kilcullen, 2008).

Dr. Kilcullen strongly advocates the *hearts and minds* approach to COIN to combat contemporary insurgents. Several themes and tenets for COIN are echoed in all of his writings, blog postings, and supporting PowerPoint presentations that get circulated

via email. In every article, Dr. Kilcullen reminds the reader that “the people remain the prize” for COIN operations – global or nation-based (Kilcullen, 2006a:6). “If you are reacting to the enemy, even if you are killing or capturing him in large numbers, then he is controlling the environment and you will eventually lose” (Kilcullen, 2006b, 108). The building of “indigenous capacity (governance, security, economics) drives external partners’ exit strategy, and determines (or should determine) an exit timeline” (Dilegge, 2007: 13). Other key tenets include:

- **Importance of intelligence** about the enemy, the culture, the terrain, and all other aspects of the operational environment can be inferred from nine of his twenty-eight articles (Kilcullen, 2006b).
- **Engaging the population** and **generating popular support** for the legitimacy of the government is contained in eight of his twenty-eight articles (Kilcullen, 2006b).
- With a focus on the population, the **primacy of influence operations** is clearly understandable. **Unity of message** is critical to perception management since every action, message, and decision by the insurgent and COIN forces shape the opinions of an indigenous population (Dilegge, 2007:14).
- **Training indigenous forces** to match the enemy’s capability (not the American image), **focusing on the enemy’s strategy** and not his actual forces, and the **importance of small, local operations** are directly mentioned as separate key points (Kilcullen, 2006b).
- Less directly mentioned is the **importance of learning** from the successes and failures, from the enemy and peer units, and from the unit that previously occupied the sector (Kilcullen, 2006b).
- **Media proliferation** can propel any tactical action, intentional or unintentional, to have significant strategic impact. The audience has become local, regional, home-nation, and global. Enemy propaganda or your own PSYOPS can be an extremely powerful weapon (Kilcullen, 2006a:6).
- Today’s enemy has morphed into **independent insurgent cells** based on micro-movements and cooperate through constant shifting alliances based only convenience – insurgencies no longer resemble large masses unified through a single unifying message (Kilcullen, 2006a:7).

- Many modern insurgencies no longer require the logistical support of the people and in many cases are wealthier than the population. The **insurgents' economic and logistics base is often externally supplied** or generated from criminal activity. This allows them to pay the poverty-stricken locals to conduct their attacks (Kilcullen, 2006a:9).
- Confusion between the term *terrorism* and *insurgency* have caused issued in the US global efforts to counter the real threat. The strategy of a **global COIN campaign** is better suited to the globalized contemporary operational environment (Kilcullen, 2005:18). Dr Kilcullen's support is summarized in Figure 7.

**Figure 7: Terrorism and Insurgency as Competing Paradigms  
(Kilcullen, 2005: 18)**

<b>Terrorism</b>	<b>Insurgency</b>
Terrorist is seen as an unrepresented aberration	Insurgent represents deeper issues in society
No negotiation with terrorists	Winning hearts and minds is critical
Methods and objectives are both unacceptable	Methods are unacceptable; objectives are not necessarily so
Terrorists are psychologically and morally flawed, with personal (psychopathic) tendencies toward violence	Insurgents use violence with an integrated politico-military strategy – violence is instrumental not central to their approach
Terrorism is a law-enforcement problem	Insurgency is a whole of government problem
Counterterrorism adopts a case-based approach focused on catching the perpetrators of terrorist actions	Counterinsurgency uses a strategy-based approach focused on defeating insurgents' strategy – catching them is secondary

- The common interpretation of the *hearts and minds* approach to COIN instructs practitioners to “be nice to the people, meet their needs, they will *feel grateful* and stop supporting the insurgents” (Kilcullen, 2007:54). Instead COIN forces must make the **population make the irrevocable choice** to support the government instead of the insurgent through persuasion, coercion, or co-optation (Kilcullen, 2007:54). To counter this wrong interpretation, Dr. Kilcullen contends the components of the approach are best defined as:
  - Hearts = the population must be convinced that our success is in their long-term interest.
  - Minds = the population must be convinced that we actually are going to win, and we (or a transition force) will permanently protect their interests (Kilcullen, 2007:55).

Ultimately this approach focuses on the perceived self-interest, not about being liked by the population. The **desire effect is respect or legitimacy**, not affection (Kilcullen, 2007:55).

## **Future Theories**

### ***4GW in Accordance with Thomas X. Hammes***

In his many writing, Thomas X. Hammes expands on the 4<sup>th</sup> Generation Warfare theory that has been initially credited to William S. Lind, *et al.* in their article “Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation” originally published in the *Marine Corps Gazette* in October of 1989. Hammes proposes that the future enemies of the United States have transitioned from a nation based insurgency into a transnational network of networks structure. The goal of war is no longer focused on the military forces. Instead using the summation of their political, economic, social, and military networks, they will attack the will and patience of the populace and the political decision makers in an effort to convince them that their strategic goals are unachievable or too costly for the potential benefit (Hammes, 2004:207-208). Utilizing the advances and subsequent proliferation in communication technology and the continuous global media coverage, the enemy no longer has to gather his forces in a single location, plan his actions through face to face meetings, or rely on a slow and potentially vulnerable printing press to convey his message. Operating through small, geographically separated cells that have no large bases or facilities, allows the enemy to easily avoid detection by the United States’ world leading, high-tech intelligence collection assets. The sheer amounts of data moving daily through cyberspace brought on by the globalization of the world aids the insurgent in this camouflage effort (Hammes, 2004:190-192).

### ***Writings of Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett***

Dr. Barnett views the world as being divided between the *Functional Core* and the *Non-Integrating Gap* depending on whether a particular nation accepts, resists, or was

denied globalization. *Globalization*, as defined by Dr. Barnett, is “the worldwide integration and increasing flows of trade, capital, ideas, and people” and is not just a economic rule set but “demands the clear enunciation and enforcement of security rule set as well” (Barnett, 2005:xvi&xvii). Functioning inside of the globalized system requires accepting the connectivity with the other members resulting from integrating one’s national economy into the global one (Barnett, 2004:125). Globalization and its “network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows, and collective security” generate stable governments and rising standards of living; thus the title of *Functional Core* (Barnett, 2003). The *Non-Integrating Gap*, however, are “plagued by politically repressive regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder, and – most importantly – the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global terrorists” (Barnett, 2003).

Concluding the enemy is not the religion of Islam or the Middle East region, Dr. Barnett advocates the real enemy must be the condition of *disconnectedness*. Stability cannot exist when parts of the world remain isolated, deprived, repressed, and uneducated. The advocates of disconnectedness who “promote it, enforce it, and terrorize those who seek to overcome it by reaching out to the larger world” are the ones that should be targeted in this new global war (Barnett, 2004:49). Although not specifically stated in terms of *insurgent* or *counterinsurgent*, Dr. Barnett advocates many efforts to neutralize these global insurgents fighting against the stability brought about by globalization. The *Non-Integrating Gap* must be shrunk – not contained – through military, intergovernmental, and even, international efforts for stability from globalization to prevail (Barnett, 2005:208-211). The *Gap*, including its exportation of

instability, radicalism, and terrorism, will not simply go away unless “the challenge of making globalization truly global” is actively neutralized (Barnett, 2003).

### **Existing Critiques of FM 3-24**

Since being published in February 2006, the Army’s *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency* has received several criticisms. The focus has been primarily its lack of scholarship, selective use of history, forgetting the role of airpower, and failing to focus on the enemy. These criticisms have been summarized here for reference. Some aspects have been examined by this research, but some are beyond the scope of this study.

#### ***Poor Scholarship***

David Price accuses the authors of extremely poor scholarship because they did a poor job of documenting sources for the FM. In fact, he claims that Chapter 3 is a “morass of borrowed quotes” (Price, 2007). He provides over ten significant and unattributed portions that closely resembled direct quotes from other published items written by authors not involved in the development of *FM 3-24* (Price, 2007). On the professional blog [SmallWarsJournal.com](http://SmallWarsJournal.com), LTC John Nagl, one of the manual’s primary authors, attempted to explain Price’s observations and justify the manual’s academic flaws:

[M]ilitary Field Manuals have their own grammar and their own logic. They are not doctoral dissertations, designed to be read by few and judged largely for the quality of their sourcing; instead, they are intended for use by soldiers. Thus authors are not named, and those whose scholarship informs the manual are only credited if they are quoted extensively. This is not the academic way, but soldiers are not academics; it is my understanding that this longstanding practice in doctrine writing is well within the provisions of “fair use” copyright law (Nagl, 2007).

While Price harshly describes *FM 3-24* as being based “on lies with the stolen words and thoughts of others,” his claims do not detract from or question its applicability to a COIN conflict (Price, 2007). Price offers no military critic or examination of the manual.

#### ***Airpower Forgotten and Other Flaws from an Airman’s Perspective***

Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap, of the United States Air Force, however, offers several critical comments about the military content of *FM 3-24*. In his short op-ed piece for the *NY Times*, he criticizes the authors because “they dismiss as passé killing or capturing insurgents” and claims “the new counterinsurgency doctrine has an anti-technology flavor that seems to discourage the use of air power” and (Dunlap, 2008). Maj Gen Dunlap expands on this second point in an Air University Monograph entitled *Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An Airman’s Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine*. In addition to advocating for a larger role for the Air Force in COIN, Maj Gen Dunlap offers several critical comments about the content, assumptions, and philosophy of *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*:

- Popular opinion portrays *FM 3-24* as being more than the doctrine for two of the services (Army and USMC), but a comprehensive solution for all of the DoD or US Government. It fails to fully capture the capabilities (especially airpower) of the American military to be considered as truly Joint doctrine (Dunlap, 2007:2-3).
- One of its most conceptual flaws is that *FM 3-24* fails to properly delineate between actions taken by all COIN security forces and those that are specific to the American forces (Dunlap, 2007:11).
- The large number of boots-on-the-ground required by *FM 3-24* fails to consider the practical problem of recruiting or sustaining this troop level. Additionally, it does not address how to build “highly trained and exceptionally talented individuals with more than expert war-fighting skills” (Dunlap, 2007:36-37).

- Acknowledging that COIN is a protracted affair, American support for the war effort is hard to sustain given the cultural aversion to high death tolls, especially where national survival is not threatened (Dunlap, 2007: 34).
- While *FM 3-24* advocates a *clear-hold-build* strategy, a modest implementation of the *oil-spot strategy* through a *hold-build-populate* approach would be easier to execute. The *hold-build-populate* approach “would identify abandoned areas, rehabilitate them so they could be self sustaining in essential services, secure them, and populate them” with “all religious groups to promote pluralism” (Dunlap, 2007:43-44).
- *FM 3-24* overemphasizes the role and importance of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) in COIN operations. HUMINT is best used to verify or clarify information collected by technical assets. Additionally, HUMINT carries the risk of gathering misinformation because of a desire for retaliation of a previous wrong. Finally, the current force does not possess the language skills for such reliance (Dunlap, 2007:49-51).
- The current security architecture and force organization do not match skills required to successfully execute the approaches advocated by *FM 3-24*. A permanent change to better execute COIN conflicts creates a vulnerability to rising peer-nations that threaten our national existence and interests (Dunlap, 2007:65-66).

Maj Gen Dunlap’s critical comments generated a number of responses. While many attacked his piece as being an effort to prove the Air Force’s relevance in the current conflicts or an Air Force propaganda piece hoping to sustain its portion of the defense budget, Dr. Steven Metz questions his recurring theme of substituting airpower for ground forces. Dr. Metz indicates that Maj Gen Dunlap fails to consider the recent trend of great dispersion tactic assumed by insurgents that has been facilitated by the Internet. Additionally, reliance on just airpower sends a message to our allies that American support is limited and might cause the regime to feel isolated and weak. This isolation and weakness historically has contributed to the collapse of the regime’s will (Metz, 2008).

### ***Fighting Forgotten***

LTC Gian P. Gentile, of the United States Army, has also been a vocal critic of *FM 3-24* and agrees with Maj Gen Dunlap that the manual lacks the imperative to fight. LTC Gentile contends that “counterinsurgency war is still war, and war in its essence is fighting” (Gentile, 2007). “War is not clean and precise; it is blunt and violent and dirty because, at its essence, it is fighting, and fighting causes misery and death” (Gentile, 2007). *FM 3-24*, in its *hearts-and-minds* approach, fails to acknowledge the essence and reality of executing a bloody counterinsurgency war. For LTC Gentile, this oversight proves to be the manual’s tragic flaw (Gentile, 2007).

LTC Gentile also challenges *FM3-24*’s apparent assumption that the people always have to be the center of gravity for all counterinsurgency operations; this approach has become known the *hearts-and-minds* approach. He argues that the authors of *FM 3-24* present this as fact despite violating Clausewitz’s teaching that a center of gravity should be discovered (Gentile, 2008b:114). This predetermined approach mandates a large contingent of troops being forward deployed, greatly limits creativity in developing military courses of action, and fails to fully consider the operational environment (Gentile, 2008b, 115). It potentially led the US forces to “violate the guidance of one of the oldest philosophers of war, Sun Tzu, to know oneself, and the enemy and the environment, too” (Gentile, 2008a:39). For LTC Gentile, that would be just as dangerous as the Army only being trained to fight conventional wars given the current threats to American security.

### ***Poor Use of History***

Echoing Maj Gen Dunlap and LTC Gentile, Ralph Peters contends that COIN “is about killing those who need killing, helping those who need help – and knowing the difference between the two” but believes the manual’s lack of emphasis on the necessity to fight results from “the dishonesty of the selective use of history” (Peters, 2007). Peters, a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel, contends that the authors focused on examples that supported their position and ignored any historical cases of more bloody campaigns that would have undercut their position. Specifically, Peters believes the authors misinterpreted Mao about COIN being 20% military and 80% political. Instead, he offers several quotes from Mao that emphasized the use of force in winning an irregular war. Peters contends that “Mao didn’t believe that round-table discussions were a substitute for killing his enemies, party purges, mass executions and the Cultural Revolution. Mao believed in force. In our COIN manual, he’s presented as a flower child” (Peters, 2007).

Additionally, Peters condemns the authors for omitting the violent and bloody methods used by the British against the Mau Mau in Kenya or by the Americans against the Moros in the Philippines because these examples would have undercut the manual’s key points. The manual’s authors’ primarily reliance on the British experience in Malaya fails to consider more violent options in case the gentler methods fail. In doing so, Peters contends the authors were not focused on offering the readers all potential options for winning the conflict, but “with defending their dissertations” (Peters, 2007). If unwilling to present the most contradicting historical evidence, Peters believes that the doctrine writers should avoid the use of history entirely. “No military can afford to indulge in the selective use of history. Soldiers must seek the truth” (Peters, 2007).

### ***COIN is Fatally Flawed for Western Democracies***

Acknowledging that the *coercion school* has historical support for their approach of using conventional firepower to destroy adversaries and to convince the population to shun the insurgents, Colin Kahl contends that this heavy-handed approach has also historically failed and may not be appropriate given the global media coverage. Kahl describes the failed efforts of Nazi Germany in Yugoslavia during World War II, the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Russians in Chechnya, and the Serbs in Bosnia in an effort to demonstrate that violence and brutality can just as easily lead to strategic failure. Additionally, “the immoral and illegal use of indiscriminate violence would require abandoning the very values Western militaries claim to protect, and it would be strategically disastrous,” especially since the images would be immediately be spread across the globe (Kahl, 2007). Countering Maj Gen Dunlap, LTC Gentile, and Ralph Peters, Kahl believes that *FM 3-24* achieves the right balance of killing those extremists that cannot be converted or reconciled without alienating the populace (Kahl, 2007).

Edward Luttwak continues the *hearts-and-minds* vs *coercion* debate in his *Harper’s Magazine* article that examines almost every chapter of *FM 3-24*, but also contends that no matter which theory the US military chooses to follow it will result in failure. The United States “cannot overcome the crippling ambivalence of occupiers who refuse to govern, and their principled and inevitable refusal to out-terrorize the insurgents, the necessary and sufficient condition of a tranquil occupation” (Luttwak, 2007). He argues that American forces were successful during the occupation of post-WWII Germany, Japan, and Italy because the military officers served as the administrators with assistance from the locals. Eventually, power and control would be

turned over to the host nation once a sense of stability existed. This approach, however, was not attempted in Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq because the Americans wanted to empower the locals that were unable, unprepared, or unwilling to provide effective governance. For reasons already discussed in early articles, Luttwak also concluded that using extremely violent methods would not be an acceptable strategy. This justification allows Luttwak to conclude the United States is unlikely to be successful in any COIN endeavor (Luttwak, 2007).

#### ***Approach is Too State-Centric and Other Contemporary Issues***

The US Army War College and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense Initiative of The Brookings Institution hosted a day-long colloquium entitled, “COIN of the Realm: US Counterinsurgency Strategy.” Experts from the military, government, and academia explored the current merits and flaws of the U.S. efforts in COIN in a non-attribution manner, but their key points were summarized in a colloquium brief prepared by Ralph Wipfli and Steven Metz. The following points were identified as potential issues with the strategy proposed by *FM 3-24*:

- The focus of restoring or augmenting a partner state during COIN operations is unrealistic since very few countries in conflict-prone regions can achieve the necessary level of legitimacy and control. Local organizations founded on sectarian, ethnic, or tribal lines often provide the services and security that the weak national government cannot. The current strategy of ignoring these sub-national groups in favor of establishing, strengthening, or sustaining a strong national government may never succeed (Wipfli, 2008:2).
- While no clear alternative was identified, the current state-centric approach to COIN proves inadequate when considering how to defeat the international enemies of the US in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Additionally, given its historical foundation, the doctrine maybe more appropriate for the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Wipfli, 2008:2&3).

- *FM 3-24* is irrelevant in the contemporary conflicts of Afghanistan and Iraq because they are not pure insurgencies. They may contain elements of an insurgency combined with struggles against an occupying force, a religious civil war, and other power struggles (Wipfli, 2008:3).
- While the doctrine maybe appropriate, the United States, however, is unable to execute it for a wide range of social, political, and military reasons (Wipfli, 2008:3).
- Technology contributions have been overlooked or underutilized to solve the problems inherent in COIN operations by the current doctrine (Wipfli, 2008:3).
- The old rule of thumb that *COIN is 20% military and 80% political* has been misinterpreted by many of the readers to mean that 80% of those involved should be civilians. “While only a political solution can end an insurgency, the bulk of the U.S. effort in terms of personnel and expense may be military” (Wipfli, 2008: 4).

While not specifically addressed in *FM 3-24* or *AFDD 2-3*, the colloquium concluded that the whole-of-government approach is required if the US is to be successful in COIN and indicated that the State Department and other agencies need to increase their COIN resources and capabilities (Wipfli, 2008: 4). This would help the efforts to achieve or transition to the recommended balance of 80% political and 20% military efforts in successful COIN campaigns.

### **Summary of Key Points**

From a thorough look at the authoritative literature for irregular warfare, a cross referenced table indicates there are critical aspects that are repeated across several authors. This table is depicted in Figure 8; an X indicates the author emphasized that critical point. These critical aspects became the starting point for the construction of the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality.

**Figure 8: Sources of Critical Aspects of Irregular Warfare Doctrine**

	Joint Publications	Gaulia	Mao	O'Neill	AQTM	USMC SWM	Nagl	Sepp	Kilcullen	Hammes	Barnett	FM 3-24	AFDD 2-3
<b>IW distinct from Traditional Warfare</b>	X	X				X	X	X	X	X			X
<b>IW is Protracted Affairs</b>	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X
<b>Clearly Distinguishes Between Insurgents and Counterinsurgents</b>	X	X		X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Emphasis on Intelligence</b>	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
<b>Focus Operations on the Population &amp; Their Support</b>	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X
<b>Interagency or Whole Gov't Approach to IW</b>	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Insurgent Isolate from Population / Closely Tied to Population</b>		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	
<b>Political Aspects More Important than Military Actions</b>	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X
<b>Must Build Perception of Legitimacy for Gov't/Cause</b>		X	X				X	X	X			X	X
<b>Understanding the Culture is Critical</b>		X				X	X		X	X	X	X	X
<b>Learning During Operation Key to Success</b>					X		X		X			X	
<b>Must Build Indigenous/HN Capability</b>	X						X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Media Must be Considered</b>	X	X		X			X	X	X	X			X
<b>Information Operations Critical</b>	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X		X	X
<b>Small Actions Preferred Over Large Unit Operations</b>			X				X	X	X				X
<b>Not all Insurgencies are the Same and Have Developmental Phases</b>		X	X	X			X		X	X	X	X	X
<b>Global Aspect to "New Insurgency"</b>	X			X	X				X	X	X		X
<b>Clear-Build-Hold Technique</b>		X						X	X			X	
<b>Airpower focused on ISR, Small Attacks, and Transpo</b>		X				X						X	

### **III. METHODOLOGY**

You [military professionals] must know something about strategy and tactics and...logistics, but also economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can know about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have...been finally solved by military power alone.

---President John F. Kennedy (*FM 3-24, 2006:2-14*)

#### **Purpose Statement**

The purpose of this research was to investigate the similarities, differences, and missing elements of the Army's *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency* and the Air Force's *Doctrine Document 2-3 Irregular Warfare* in order to gain insights about the aspects of overarching joint doctrine that would better allow the individual services to complement each other in IW; to coordinate the most effective play of the *joint team*. Finally, some implications might be discerned if the enemy proves to be truly transnational instead of nation based. These observations were discerned by constructing the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality.

#### **Research Paradigm**

This research was primarily a qualitative analysis that utilized content analysis. The existing authoritative literature was examined to capture the key points for a baseline comparison against the newly published doctrine. A comprehensive study was then conducted on *FM 3-24* and *AFDD 2-3* in order to determine the key points utilized by the doctrine writers. Using those critical points, a House of Quality-like approach was constructed to organize those points. The Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality displays the congruence, conflict, complements, and missing aspects of the Army's and

the Air Force's doctrinal documents. Overarching joint doctrine fundamentals recommendations were gleaned from this analysis. Finally, based on theoretical projections for the future operating environment provided by the theories of Thomas Hammes, Thomas P.M. Barnett, and others, a gap analysis was conducted to determine if the doctrine could be suitable against a transnational enemy. The final Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality serves as a single point of reference for the critical points that should be included in the future Joint Publications focused on irregular warfare.

### **Pre-Content Analysis**

Since the primary reasons for undertaking this study is to investigate the possibility of determining some fundamentals for joint doctrine in irregular warfare, a prerequisite is a thorough understanding of the foundation of joint operations as published in the two keystone manuals: *JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* and *JP 3-0 Joint Operations*. Despite being published after the individual service's doctrine, the Department of Defense's *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept* was also consulted. Comprehension of the fundamentals of irregular warfare as published in the authoritative publications discussed in the Literature Review Chapter also became important to a thorough analysis of the newly published doctrine. Additionally, the authoritative material helped to determine how the doctrine can be expanded to address the nature of our interconnected world.

### **Content Analysis**

Since this research focuses on the Army's and Air Force's recently published doctrine, the data came from the approved versions of these documents. These documents have been obtained from the service's official publication websites in order to

avoid unofficial versions, publically released adaptations, or early drafts of the documents.

## **Experimental Design**

In conducting the research, the following steps were utilized in order to generate data and to organize the information for analysis and support the conclusions.

- 1) Capture main ideas/concepts from existing authoritative literature.
- 2) Capture main ideas/concepts from FM 3-24 and AFDD 2-3.
- 3) Build the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality as described below.
- 4) Examine the IWC HOQ to determine congruence, conflict, and complements between the manuals.
- 5) Examine the IWC HOQ to determine missing elements as compared to other authoritative publications.
- 6) Determine fundamentals that are applicable to future joint doctrine on IW.
- 7) Examine applicability of the published doctrine to transnational insurgency.

## **Hypothesis**

This research reveals recommended key fundamentals for joint doctrine on irregular warfare. Current doctrine has been focused more on nation based irregular warfare, not considering the emergence of transnational enemies that oppose or threaten US security.

## **Assumptions**

The principal assumption made during this research is that the historical lessons that become the foundations for the military's doctrine can transcend time. In other words, the doctrine is broad enough to be applied in future conflicts but not so narrowly defined that it only leads to success in the last war fought. This challenge of transcending

time has become more difficult and increasingly critical for success in the rapidly-changing, globalized world and its ever increasing complexity. The challenge is exacerbated by the lengthy bureaucratic process required to publish an update to a military publication. While this is a weakness of doctrine, most errors result from the misapplication of the doctrine, a mistaken interpretation about the operational environment, a wrong assumption about the adversary, or failure to adapt to the enemy's change in strategy or tactics as the conflict progresses. Doctrine attempts to account for these potential mistakes by allowing commander's judgment in its application; however, it is absolutely essential that commanders understand the operational environment in order to properly apply doctrine.

Since *JP 3-24: Counterinsurgency* will not be approved or officially published until May of 2009, this manual's various draft forms have not been included (Joint Staff, 2007:3). The same is true the various draft versions of USMC's *Small Wars Manual*, NATO's recently announced COIN doctrine project, and *FM 3-24.2 Infantry COIN Tactics*; none of the documents have been officially published in an approved version. Subsequent revisions or releases could make some or all of the conclusions drawn in this study obsolete or highlight new ones.

Other irregular warfare and COIN focused handbooks or guides have also been omitted from in-depth study. Their extremely narrow focus on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) applicable for only a particular sized unit (i.e. squad or platoon), for only one particular region, or for only one country severely limited their ability to propose overarching guiding principles. Most of these handbooks are strictly focused at the tactical level of war and the *how-to* aspects of warfighting. Additionally, most of

these publications' key points were later incorporated during the formulation of *FM 3-24* or were based on the principles of *FM 3-24*.

## **Limitations**

The research is limited by the lack of independent Navy or Coast Guard doctrine for Irregular Warfare. Therefore, recommendations have been made solely based on Army/USMC and Air Force publications. The analysis is also limited by the lack of officially approved, published doctrine from a Joint or NATO perspective.

The conclusions are also limited by the intended focus or scope of the different doctrinal manuals. *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, while briefly discussing insurgency, focuses primarily on just one aspect of the IW spectrum. Given the much broader title of *AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare*, the expectation is that it examines all operations composing irregular warfare. This disparity limited the ability to compare both documents on an equal basis and caused the identification of some differences that were inherent in their scope.

Additionally, the authors of the manuals wrote their respective documents for the peculiarities of their service. The differences go beyond just the differences in a *ground vs. air* perspective. *FM 3-24* is written to provide guidance to leaders that have near-intimate contact on a daily basis with the population. In fact the “primary audience for this manual is leaders and planners at the battalion level and above” (*FM3-24*, 2006:vii). This could be interpreted to mean the leaders at the tactical and operational levels of war. *AFDD 2-3*, however, focuses on the operational and strategic levels of war. Additionally, it focuses more on countering adversaries and the differences in the application of force

from traditional warfare (*AFDD 2-3, 2007:vi*). This *hearts& minds* vs. *coercion* difference also created some intrinsically-based differences.


### **Building the House of Quality (HOQ)**

When describing the House of Quality, the academic authors emphasize that this tool was intended to be configured in order to match the needs of that particular organization (Hauser, 1988:68). For the purposes of this study, the construction and content of the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality (IWC HOQ) has been modified to match its goals. For the business community, James R. Evans and William M. Lindsay in their textbook, *The Management and Control of Quality*, suggests that the basic HOQ can be built in six steps.

1. Identify customer attributes.
2. Identify counterpart characteristics.
3. Relate the customer attributes to the counterpart characteristics.
4. Conduct an evaluation of competing products.
5. Evaluate counterpart characteristics and develop targets.
6. Determine which counterpart characteristic to deploy in the remainder of the product process (Evans, 1993:152-153).

An example of the basic House of Quality model can be found in Figure 9. These six steps are further explained in the following text, along with a brief description of how they were modified in order to build the IWC HOQ.

**Figure 9: House of Quality Example (Evans, 1993:153)**



***Step 1: Identify Customer Attributes (CAs)***

The construction of the HOQ starts with determining what the customers really want; these descriptions are called *customer attributes* (Hauser, 1988:65). Since this step in the process sets the foundation for the rest of the HOQ, capturing these CAs becomes the most critical and most difficult one to accomplish successfully. Precision, accuracy, and clarity are important to avoid misinterpretation or having to infer the true meaning of the customer's desires (Evans, 1993: 154). Customer Attributes are often bundled under a heading that represents an overall customer concern and bundles maybe further consolidated if it adds in the process (Hauser, 1988:65).

The *customer* for this model has been defined as the appropriate content for the doctrinal manuals, not the actual reader of the doctrinal manuals. For the purposes of building the IWC HOQ, customer attributes equates to the key points discerned from the examination of the authoritative publications on irregular warfare including the foundational Joint Publications. These CAs have been bundled under a more generic

irregular warfare topic and not the author proposing them. The CA titles and their definitions for the IWC HOQ are listed in Figure 10.

**Figure 10: Customer Attributes (CA) and their Brief Description**

CA Title	Brief Description of the CA
IW distinct from Traditional Warfare	IW is not a lesser included form of Traditional Warfare; it is a distinct form of warfare that should have its own specific doctrine
IW is Protracted Affairs	IW does not lend itself to a rapid victory & typically is measured in years or decades
Clearly Distinguishes Between Insurgents & Counterinsurgents	Doctrine should clearly distinguish between the protagonists of the conflict; each has different strategy and tactics to achieve their goals
Emphasis on Intelligence	Intelligence about the enemy and operational environment should be in a high priority; enables many other customer attributes
Focus Operations on the Population & Their Support	IW's objective is focused on the people and building their support for the government or the insurgent's cause
Interagency or Whole Gov't Approach to IW	A gov't involved in IW must mobilize the entire gov't & not strictly rely on the military to execute the strategy
Insurgent Isolate from Population / Closely Tied to Population	The bond between the insurgent and the population often becomes a critical factor in the success of IW operations
Political Aspects More Important than Military Actions	Since people are the goal, political mobilization of them is more important than military operations aimed at destroying the enemy
Must Build Perception of Legitimacy for Gov't/Cause	This perception ties directly into the people's support of the Gov't or Insurgent cause
Understanding the Culture is Critical	This directly effects the ability to build perceptions; not every culture has the same values and viewpoints
Learning During Operation Key to Success	It is critical to learn from failures, successes, & about the constantly changing operational environment
Must Build Indigenous/HN Capability	Exit & success criteria will depend on the ability of the HN or Indigenous people to function w/o assistance
Media Must be Considered	Media presence must be considered and their reporting impact on all audiences in mere seconds
Information Operations Critical	Information Operations are critical to building perception & can have profound impact on population; this critical aspect can facilitate many of the other customer attributes
Small Actions Preferred Over Large Unit Operations	Local actions more important to show improvement than national initiatives that do not meet the people's immediate needs
Not all Insurgencies are the Same and Have Developmental Phases	Insurgencies or groups of insurgencies have different motives, methods, goals, and culture; they can be classified by a set of developmental phases
Global Aspect to "New Insurgency"	While insurgencies may function inside a nation's borders, analysis should have a global focus too.
Clear-Build-Hold Technique	COIN doctrine should address this tactic given its historically proven success rate
Airpower focused on ISR, Small Attacks, and Transpo	Airpower should be in a support role to the ground forces attempts to build support of the population

## ***Step 2: Identify Counterpart Characteristics (CCs)***

*Counterpart characteristics* are typically defined as the customer's voice translated into technical language that will be used throughout the development process. Effectively, this is the opinion of the firm or its engineers about what a product should contain or accomplish. In the business world, output is controlled and compared to these goals (Evans, 1993:154&156). For the IWC HOQ, these CCs equate to concepts grouped under the separate chapter or appendix titles utilized by the doctrine authors of *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* and *AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare*. Figure 11 describes the CC derived from *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, and Figure 12 describes the CCs derived from *AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare*. The listing of these concepts form the *second floor* of the IWC HOQ, as depicted in Figure 13.

Additionally during Step 2 of the building process, the roof of the HOQ is built to display the interrelationships between any pair of counterpart characteristics and the strength of those relationships. In the business realm, this is used to assess trade-offs between characteristics and thus, focuses on the collective product instead of the individual characteristic (Evans, 1993:156). For the IWC HOQ, the relationship analysis was confined to the concepts proposed by the different documents and was not conducted on the concepts proposed by the same manual. This intentional omission attempts to highlight the differences between the doctrinal documents and does not focus on the analysis of a single documents internal content.

In the IWC HOQ, the following numeric values were used to display the interrelationship between the overarching concepts in the doctrinal documents: 3 = very

strong relationship; 2 = strong relationship; 1= weak relationship; and blank = no discernable relationship. The following descriptions were used to define these rankings:

- Very Strong Relationships (3) – the same overall concepts were discussed using almost the same words; no differences or nuances offered in the definitions; direct applicability or influence between the concepts
- Strong Relationships (2) – the same overall concepts were discussed; slight differences or nuances allowed in the definitions; some applicability or influence between the concepts
- Weak Relationship (1) – allusion to aspects of the same concepts; major differences of nuances in the definitions; very little applicability or influence shared between the concepts
- No Discernable Relationship (blank) – no overlap of the concepts or their aspects found; no applicability or influence shared between the concepts

These numeric rankings of the interrelationship between the Counterpart Characteristics (or overarching concepts of the doctrine) can also be found in roof of the House of Quality displayed in Figure 13.


**Figure 11: Key Components of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency  
(Counterpart Characteristics for the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality)**

CC Title	Description of CC & Concepts Included
Insurgency & Counterinsurgency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Definition of Terms</li> <li>• Description of Insurgency – <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Goals, Evolution, Motives, &amp; Approaches</li> <li>◦ Mobilization Means</li> <li>◦ Elements, Dynamics, &amp; Vulnerabilities</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Description of COIN – (See Appendix B for Details of These Topics) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Historical Principles</li> <li>◦ Contemporary Imperatives</li> <li>◦ Paradoxes</li> <li>◦ Successful/Unsuccessful Practices</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Unity of Effort	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Civil and Military Activity Integration</li> <li>• Key COIN Participants and Likely Roles</li> <li>• Responsibilities of Participants in COIN</li> <li>• Mechanisms for Integration</li> <li>• Tactical-level Interagency Considerations</li> </ul>
Intelligence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intel Characteristics in COIN</li> <li>• Predeployment Planning</li> <li>• ISR Operations</li> <li>• Counter-intelligence and Counter-reconnaissance</li> <li>• All-Source Intel</li> <li>• Intel Collaboration</li> </ul>
Designing COIN Campaigns & Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relationship between design &amp; planning</li> <li>• Design Nature &amp; Considerations</li> </ul>
Executing COIN Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nature of COIN Operations</li> <li>• Logical Lines of Operations in COIN</li> <li>• COIN Approaches</li> <li>• Assessment of COIN Operations</li> <li>• Targeting</li> <li>• Learning and Adapting</li> </ul>
Developing HN Security Forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Types of Security Forces</li> <li>• Challenges, Resources, Domains, &amp; Framework</li> <li>• Police in COIN</li> </ul>
Leadership & Ethics for COIN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Large and Small Unit Leadership Tenets</li> <li>• Ethics</li> <li>• Warfighting vs Policing</li> <li>• Proportionality and Discrimination</li> <li>• Learning Imperative</li> </ul>
Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Logistics Consideration</li> <li>• Logistics Support to Logical Lines of Operations</li> <li>• Contracted Support</li> </ul>
A Guide For Action	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mimics Dr. Kilcullen's "28 Articles: Fundamental of Comp.-Level COIN"</li> </ul>
Social Network Analysis & Other Tools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How to describe Effects of Operational Environment</li> <li>• How to evaluate the Threats / Enemy</li> </ul>
Linguist Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support Categories and Selection Criteria</li> <li>• Employment TPPs</li> <li>• Establishing Rapport</li> <li>• Orienting Interpreters</li> <li>• Preparing for &amp; Conducting Presentations</li> <li>• Speaking Techniques</li> </ul>
Legal Considerations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Specific Advice for COIN</li> </ul>
Airpower in COIN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• General Overview</li> <li>• Strike Role</li> <li>• Intelligence Collection</li> <li>• Air &amp; Space Information Ops</li> <li>• High Tech Assets &amp; Low Tech Assets</li> <li>• Airlift</li> <li>• Airpower Command Structure</li> <li>• Building HN Capability</li> </ul>

**Figure 12: Key Components of AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare  
(Counterpart Characteristics of the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality)**

CC Title	Description of CC & Concepts Included
Understanding IW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Definition of Terms – Types of Warfare, Insurgency, COIN</li> <li>• IW Model (See Appendix C for Details)</li> <li>• IW Truths for Airmen (See Appendix C for Details)</li> <li>• COIN Truths for Airmen (See Appendix C for Details)</li> <li>• Insurgency and Terrorism Defined</li> <li>• Counterinsurgency and Terrorism</li> </ul>
Air Force Applications in IW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Value of AF Capabilities in IW <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Minimal Intrusiveness</li> <li>◦ Rapid Response – Mobility &amp; Engagement</li> <li>◦ Improve Strategic, Operational, &amp; Tactical Situational Awareness</li> </ul> </li> <li>• IW Activities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Support to Insurgencies</li> <li>◦ COIN &amp; Support to COIN (See Appendix C for Details)</li> <li>◦ Shaping and Deterring</li> <li>◦ Counterterrorism</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Air Force Capabilities in IW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Building Partnership Capacity</li> <li>• Intelligence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Analysis and Targeting</li> <li>◦ Collection</li> <li>◦ Distributed Operations</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Information Operations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Network Warfare Operations</li> <li>◦ Electronic Warfare</li> <li>◦ Influence Operations</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Air Mobility – Deployment, Sustainment, &amp; Mobility</li> <li>• Agile Combat Support in IW – Civil Engineering &amp; Medical Evacuation</li> <li>• Precision Engagement</li> <li>• Command &amp; Control</li> </ul>
Strategy and Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategy Considerations – Differences in IW</li> <li>• Operational Environment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Failed States</li> <li>◦ Cooperative Governments</li> <li>◦ Non-Cooperative Governments</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Theater Security Cooperation Plan</li> <li>• Strategy Development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Understanding the Environment &amp; History of the Region</li> <li>◦ Integration w/ Political &amp; Other Interagency Organizations</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Planning Considerations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Legal Considerations</li> <li>◦ Operational Phases (See Appendix C for Details)</li> <li>◦ Shaping and Deterring Operations</li> <li>◦ Counterterrorism</li> <li>◦ Support to COIN – Indirect and Direct</li> <li>◦ COIN</li> <li>◦ Support to an Insurgency</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Assessment</li> </ul>
IW Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Command and Control</li> <li>• Environment for Employment – Force Presentation</li> <li>• Executing Operations</li> </ul>
Understanding Insurgencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Insurgent Motivations</li> <li>• Organization</li> <li>• Operations</li> <li>• Strategy Used by Insurgents</li> </ul>

**Figure 13: Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality:  
Foundation, Second Floor, & Roof**



### ***Step 3: Relate the Customer Attributes to the Counterpart Characteristics***


With the Customer Attributes listed down the left side and the Counterpart Characteristics on the second floor, the matrix for comparison has been constructed to display the interrelationship. The purpose of this relationship matrix is to determine if the CCs adequately cover the CAs. It answers the question: *has the design team heeded the customer's demands?* Voids indicate that the product may have difficulty in satisfying the customer, and a CC that does not match any CA could be wasted effort, redundant, or poor design (Evans, 1993:156). Either way, it is a clear indication that problems exist in the design.

In the IWC HOQ, the following numeric values were used to display the relationship between key concepts discerned from the examination of the authoritative publications (CAs) and the key points included in the doctrinal documents (CCs): 3 = very strong relationship; 2 = strong relationship; 1= weak relationship; and blank = no discernable relationship. Like the numerical rankings in the roof of the House of Quality, these values are described as:

- Very Strong Relationships (3) – the same overall concepts were discussed using almost the same words; no differences or nuances offered in the definitions; direct applicability or influence between the concepts
- Strong Relationships (2) – the same overall concepts were discussed; slight differences or nuances allowed in the definitions; some applicability or influence between the concepts
- Weak Relationship (1) – allusion to aspects of the same concepts; major differences of nuances in the definitions; very little applicability or influence shared between the concepts
- No Discernable Relationship (blank) – no overlap of the concepts or their aspects found; no applicability or influence shared between the concepts

Analysis of this chart immediately highlights the ability of doctrine to address the key points made by the authoritative literature. Further examination of this construction stage of the IWC HOQ begins to demonstrate the similarities and differences of the Army's *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* and the Air Force's *Doctrine Document 2-3 Irregular Warfare*. Figure 14 displays these relationships added to the IWC HOQ.

**Figure 14: Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality:  
Comparison of Customer Attributes and Counterpart Characteristics**



#### ***Step 4: Conduct an Evaluation of Competing Products***

During this step of construction, two additional elements are added to the House of Quality. The importance rating or value ranking for each customer attribute should be added on the side of the comparison matrix. This addition is to emphasize that not all Customer Attributes hold equal value for the customer and to help decision makers focus on those items with the largest benefit. Obviously, trade-offs should favor the customer attribute with the higher ranking (Evans 1993:156-157).

To the right of the comparison matrix, competing products are ranked against each other according to the Customer Attributes in order to determine areas of competitive advantage. This step is intended to help highlight opportunities for improvement programs and focus attention on areas to promote as strengths. Ultimately, this step determines how your product, or product proposal, compares to those of your competitors (Evans, 1993:156-157).

For this study's Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality, the ranking of the Customer Attributes has been included, but the ranking of competing products has been omitted. Although the ranking of Customer Attributes is a subjective scoring, the ones included in Figure 15 are based on the emphasis contained in the authoritative literature. Utilizing Figure 8: Sources of Critical Aspects of Irregular Warfare Doctrine as a basis, the following scoring method was determined:


- 5 = included in 10 or more of the 11 authoritative authors/works considered
- 4 = included in 8 or more of the 11 authoritative authors/works considered
- 3 = included in 6 or more of the 11 authoritative authors/works considered
- 2 = included in 4 or more of the 11 authoritative authors/works considered

- 1 = included in 3 or less of the 11 authoritative authors/works considered

A more appropriate ranking method is to allow future users of the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality given their particular operational environment, considering their commander's priority guidance, and based on lessons drawn from contemporary or future conflicts to select appropriate weights. A number of decision analysis techniques are available to conduct such weighting.

Competing product rankings proved to add little value to this study. Since alternative doctrine from a Naval, Coast Guard, Joint, or NATO perspective does not exist or are currently in various stages of development, competing products directly applicable to the United States Military do not exist in an officially published format. Additionally, the irregular warfare doctrine of other countries, such as France, Russia, Great Britain, and Australia, were beyond the scope of the study, but can easily be included in future studies or refinements of the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality. Due to the struggles the US has faced in Iraq and the use of NATO forces in Afghanistan, the likelihood of more countries publishing military doctrine focused on irregular warfare has dramatically increased.

**Figure 15: Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality:  
Addition of Ranking of the Customer Attributes**



### ***Step 5: Evaluate Counterpart Characteristics and Develop Targets***

This construction step focuses on evaluating the counterpart characteristics between competitive products to aid in determination of competitive advantage and to focus future product development or refinement. Typically this process starts with in-house testing of the products to gauge the CC, and the results are turned into measureable terms for comparison. These results are recorded into the basement of the House of Quality with rows representing each competitive product. Comparing the newly determined strengths and weaknesses for competitive products, management can now set target values or goals for each Counterpart Characteristic (Evans, 1993:159). If designed correctly during Step 2, the CC will be an objective measure that can easily be determined in a relevant unit of measurement that the product engineers understand. Additionally, the target values or goals become a benchmark that does not depend on a subjective assessment and should better withstand scrutiny by top level management (Hauser, 1988:67).

Additional insights might be gleaned if there is a difference in the customer's ranking of competing products (as determined in Step 4) and the firm's evaluation of the products during this step. These inconsistencies could result from faulty measurements during testing or a skewed customer perception about the product resulting from some image problem (Hauser, 1988:67). These differences should influence the options explored by the senior decision makers in order to sustain, gain, or regain competitive advantage against their rivals.

For the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality in this study, competing product rankings for the Counterpart Characteristics have been omitted from the model.


As indicated in the description of Step 4, these rankings provided little value to this study given the lack of alternative doctrine directly applicable to the US Military. As the amount of US or foreign Irregular Warfare military doctrine increases, the completion of this step increases in importance.

Although artificial and subjective, a proposed benchmark or target value has been included in this study's Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality. Instead of rating competing products to determine the target value, content analysis was conducted to determine the potential applicability to the Joint Force's execution of IW. Since *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, is jointly published by the Army and the Marine Corps (as *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5*), the content will have to potentially apply to some other service (Air Force, Navy, or Coast Guard) in order to get a higher score and avoid a natural skewing of the rankings. The following scoring methodology was used to establish the proposed benchmark for the Counterpart Characteristics (or separate chapters) of the Irregular Warfare doctrine:

- 3 = strong potential applicability to more than one branch of service
- 2 = potential applicability to more than one branch of service
- 1 = little or vague potential applicability to more than one branch of service
- 0 = strictly specific to only one branch of service

These benchmarks have been added to the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality displayed in Figure 16, in what is typically referred to as the *basement*.

**Figure 16: Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality:  
Proposed Applicability to Joint Warfare**




### ***Step 6: Determine which to Deploy in the Remainder of the Production Process***

During this step, the Counterpart Characteristics that require focused attention are identified in order to ensure the customer's voice is maintained throughout the remainder of the design or production process. These CCs have "a strong relationship to the customer needs, have poor competitive performance, or are strong selling points" (Evans, 1993:159). By selecting them for *deployment*, managers clearly delineate the firm's focus in order to prevent everything from becoming a priority and to assist in the best allocation of limited resources. Most importantly, managers ensure that the voice of the customer is sustained throughout the process by this selection of priorities. There is no need to waste effort on items that have little value to the customer or have little impact on the product's image (Evans, 1993:159).

In providing recommendations for deployment of Counterpart Characteristics based on this study's Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality, the concept was very simple. Simply choosing the CC with the value of 3 for future Joint Publications on Irregular Warfare is the best way to focus the writers of the future doctrine on the aspects of these manuals that likely provides them the most assistance. In Figure 17, the last step of construction is shown; any item with a check mark indicates the areas recommended for *deployment* into the future Joint Publications by this study.

**Figure 17: Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality: Construction Complete**



## **Using the House of Quality**

While the House of Quality is only the first step in Quality Function Deployment, it provides insights into a strategic direction for top management based on an understanding of the customer's desires and needs. To ensure success, the customer's voice must be carried throughout the entire design and production process (Evans, 1993:161). This process can be continued to construct a total of four houses that aid in further developing the focus on the voice of the customer. The second house is mainly concerned with detailed product design. Beginning the transition from planning to execution, the third house focuses on process planning. The fourth and final house examines the production process. Quality Function Deployment proponents contend that these four linked houses convey the customer's desires throughout the entire manufacturing process (Hauser, 1988:71&73).

While difficult decisions still need to be made, the HOQ provides a means to display and debate priorities that should be incorporated into or in accordance with a business's strategy. It helps to understand the links or relationships between the Customer Attributes and Counterpart Characteristics and the necessary trade-offs required to achieve improvement in a single CC (Hauser, 1988:68-70). The proponents of the House of Quality acknowledge that creating the HOQ is not a simple process given the necessary change to *typical business thinking* and modifying organization culture. The benefits "can help break down functional barriers and encourage teamwork, serious efforts to implement it will be many times rewarded...It gets people thinking in the right directions and thinking together" (Hauser, 1988:73).

Utilizing the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality will aid Joint doctrine writers face the challenges of getting the services to agree on a single set of principles. Like any sports team, each member of the Joint Team has a unique set of capabilities and skill sets. When synergistically applied to the variety of missions and tasks included in Irregular Warfare, those unique characteristics greatly contribute to the success of the US military team. The leaders of the Joint team are guided in the application of these unique capabilities by the foundational principles found in doctrine.

By constructing the first house, this discussion can begin with a common reference point. The IWC HOQ will help encourage *joint thinking* over service parochialism by providing a starting place for the debate. As Maj Gen Dunlap of the Air Force and LTC Nagl of the Army jointly note:

The competitiveness outsiders may see in military debates can be misread as mere parochial squabbling. Sometimes that is true, but more often the rivalry reflects honestly-held but differing beliefs as to how to use the military instrument most effectively in today's very complex environments (Dunlap, 2008).

Such discussions by the leaders of the US Armed Forces can be used to continue the construction process of the other three houses as part of the process of writing truly Joint doctrine.

## IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Experience in one location cannot be assumed to apply to the environment of another. Over-emphasis on experience gained in a particular operation and environment can lead to inaccurate conclusions about the requirements and capabilities needed elsewhere, and could result in conceptual inflexibility in both hardware and general support.

---Air Force Manual 2-5, 10 March 1967 (AFDD 2-3, 2007:70)

### **Overview**

Through an examination of the different services' doctrine utilizing a House of Quality matrix, determinations have been discerned about the similarities, differences, and missing elements of the Army's *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* and the Air Force's *Doctrine Document 2-3 Irregular Warfare*. Despite the threat of service parochialism, relative rankings for the Customer Attributes (the critical aspects from authoritative literature), Counterpart Characteristics (concepts grouped under the chapter titles from the published doctrine), and recommendation for items ready for deployment in Joint doctrine have been included in the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality. This completed model can help the doctrine writers analyze the content of the current doctrine and understand the best current doctrinal source for a particular concept or topic.

### **Findings and Analysis**

#### ***Critical Aspects Derived from Authoritarian Works and Authors***

Examining the voluminous amounts of literature on Irregular Warfare, repetitive citations and references guided the determination of those authors and works that qualify as authoritative. From an examination of the authoritative literature, critical concepts for inclusion in Irregular Warfare doctrine emerged. With the exception of the *Focus of*

*Airpower* aspect, each of these critical aspects were thoroughly discussed in three or more of the chosen reference materials; as displayed in Figure 7.

The aspect, *Emphasis on Intelligence*, permeated throughout the largest number of works. In many cases, the theme was echoed as a means to aid in the accomplishment of the other critical aspects or to further bolster the support of other points proposed as critical. With the value placed on intelligence about the enemy and the operational environment in all types of military operations, this commonality should be expected.

*Intelligence drives operations* is a very common phrase to most military professionals. Given the nature of the insurgent's close relationship with the population, it becomes even more critical in irregular warfare. In COIN it allows the better separation of the insurgent from the population. When supporting an insurgency, intelligence allows better targeting of an adversary's weakness and the ability to blend in better with the populace (use them for camouflage).

The second most common aspects focused on the population and emphasized the importance of the political operations in Irregular Warfare. The very definition of Irregular Warfare explains this repetition in the doctrinal works: “A violent struggle among states and non-states actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population” (*IW JOC*, 2007:6). Given the typical conventional warrior's desire to focus predominately on the enemy destruction, these aspects require redundancy in order to help guide appropriate strategy and tactics.

The third most popular aspects are the clear distinction between *IW* and *Traditional Warfare* and the emphasis that *insurgencies developing in different stages* and should be considered different or distinct. Again, this addresses the conventional

warrior's misunderstandings about IW and helps him to develop strategies best suited for the assigned operations or enemies. The focus on clearly distinguishing characteristics of insurgencies and their development process gives a combatant the ability to better understand the insurgency's strengths, weaknesses, strategy and tactics. This is extremely important for success whether you are supporting or fighting the insurgents in Irregular Warfare.

The elements with the least amount of repetition in the authoritative literature are newer titles for common practices or focused around new technology. Interestingly, many historians find the inability to learn and adapt as a root cause to some of the most famous military failures. Learning and adapting has always been considered important for military leaders, but very little emphasis has been placed on learning during operations. In many cases, this emphasis occurs after the operation is complete so lessons can be objectively examined and subsequently implemented in future operations. Unfortunately the new communication technology and lack of a bureaucratic hierarchy structure of the enemy, the window for learning and adapting has been greatly reduced. Instead it seems that leaders in irregular warfare are constantly reacting to enemy actions and struggle to regain the initiative. Change must happen faster to successfully counter the irregular warfare opponents.

The fact that a tactic for implementing the strategic goals has been mentioned three times should be considered significant despite the lack of a high value. Generally, these works focused at the strategic and operational level of warfare. The historical success of the tactic of *clear-build-hold* in counterinsurgency elevates its significance and justifies its inclusion in the critical aspects listing. While this is only one tool that a

counterinsurgent should have in his tool bag, it should be considered a *tried and true* stand-by technique or a favored option. Specific accomplishment of this tactic, however, is left to the individual commander to account for the uniqueness of his region and operational environment. The largest challenge still remains the full transition of responsibility of these gains to the host nation or indigenous forces.

While the *Focus of Airpower* aspect was not as repetitive as others, it seems to be one of the most debated topics when discussing Irregular Warfare doctrine. It was intentionally included to further foster the vigorous, contemporary debate on this subject as military professionals continue this debate in various professional articles, on military blog or journal sites, and in conversations between members of the services. The proponents of more Airpower generally argue that it provides the largest asymmetrical advantage to the US military (AFDD2-3, 2007:foreward). Antagonists believe that insurgent enemies rarely present lucrative targets for airpower (“Airpower,” 2006) and that use of bombs tend to breed new enemies in a civilian populace that suffers as the unintended collateral damage (Pena, 2008). The worst aspect of this debate can be seen in the parochial bickering or the justifications for a larger portion of the Defense budget. The best aspect, however, can be seen as military leaders discuss the best utilization of this technological advantage in order to defeat the enemy and protect the lives of service members (Dunlap, 2008).

Ultimately, the debate hinges on the nature of the operational environment or assumptions about its nature; so the answer likely will be: *it depends*. A truly joint perspective will not focus on the primacy of one service over another, but will explore how to best employ the special characteristics of its team members to counter the threat

inside of the unique operational environment. Trying to specify a *best practice*, or narrow set of roles, for Airpower in Irregular Warfare doctrine limits the usefulness of such guidance. A much better option would be to provide a list, as comprehensive as possible, of the missions or roles that Airpower can perform to support Irregular Warfare. Couple that list with some basic guidance when tasks are most conducive given some specific operational environment characteristics, and the doctrinal guidance proves much more valuable. Again, the military commanders will have to judicially apply the doctrine to their particular operational environment when accomplishing their assigned missions.

### ***General Comparison of the Doctrinal Works***

Despite the great difference in page totals, both doctrinal documents proved very applicable in creating an understanding about Irregular Warfare. The ninety-eight pages of *AFDD 2-3* prove to be most applicable when viewing the mission from the strategic level down to the operational level. The two hundred and sixty-eight pages of *FM 3-24* prove to focus on the tactical level up to the operational level. As expected, the broader scope of the entire Irregular Warfare spectrum contained in *AFDD 2-3* has a benefit for gaining a general understanding about the potential missions: supporting an insurgency, supporting counterinsurgency, or conducting counterinsurgency. *AFDD 2-3*, however, fails to fully explore a specific mission in any great detail. *FM 3-24* and its narrow focus on just one aspect – counterinsurgency – explores the nuances of that particular mission. *FM 3-24*, however, fails to fully explore the general broader topic of irregular warfare and, understandably, does not consider any aspects of supporting an insurgency.

Interestingly, the two works seem to complement each other in providing the necessary general and specific guidance that should be contained in overarching Joint doctrine.

### ***AFDD 2-3 Specific Findings and Analysis***

As previously noted, *AFDD 2-3* provides a more general level of guidance at the strategic and operational levels of war. While the manual provides a good overview of Irregular Warfare, the authors seemed to favor supporting or conducting counterinsurgency over the other mission of Irregular Warfare: support to an insurgency. In fact, a quick scan of the table of contents reveals that only four topics or subtopics directly list *support to insurgency* as a reference. This could result from the definition for *support to insurgency* used by the authors:

Support to Insurgency as discussed in this document pertains to those operations against an illegitimate or occupying power (e.g. Vichy French in World War II). [sic] It is important to note that supporting an insurgent movement against a legitimate government is authorized when conducted for national defense (e.g., Operation ENDURING FREEDOM [OEF] against the Taliban in Afghanistan) or when in accordance with a United Nations Security Council mandate (AFDD2-3, 2007:6).

Since the *Afghan Model* was initially widely proclaimed by several military and civilian leaders as the desired method for future conflicts, this definition does not seem to limit the doctrinal emphasis on supporting an insurgency (Biddle, 2002:2).

As further evidence of the bias, the authors propose “IW Truths for Airmen” and “COIN Truths for Airman,” but do not offer any *Truths* specifically related to conducting or supporting an insurgency (*AFDD2-3*, 2007:9-10). In Chapter 2: Air Force Application in IW, *support to an insurgency* is covered for about three quarters of a page (*AFDD2-3*, 2007:18-19), but *COIN and Support to COIN* is covered in more than eight

pages (*AFDD2-3*, 2007:19-26). Similar ratios exist in Chapter 3, but Chapter 4 has an increase in pages dedicated to *support to an insurgency* to a total of three (*AFDD2-3*, 2007:63-65). This continues throughout the rest of the manual. While much of the doctrinal guidance attempts to be applicable to Irregular Warfare's entire spectrum, the preponderance of the specific-focused material considers supporting or conducting COIN.

This bias probably results from the nature of the conflicts that the United States is currently fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. The significant adjustments required by the United States Air Force to fight those COIN campaigns are far greater than the smaller tweaks to conduct operations similar to the initial phases of OEF in Afghanistan – which closely resembled the traditional conventional air campaigns that the US military favors. Additionally, given the significant struggles of the US military in those theaters, much greater pressure exists to address COIN specific issues in order to win the wars currently being waged. After winning those conflicts, time can be spent gleaning the guiding principles of a much more successful campaign – the support provided to the Northern Alliance to quickly topple the Taliban in Afghanistan.

To compound matters for the United States Air Force, several critics have ruthlessly attacked their publically proclaimed procurement priority of the F-22, their organizational culture that seemingly favors technological solutions to all military problems, and their perceived questionable relevancy in the protracted nature of Irregular Warfare. Questions continue to loom about the Air Force's contribution to the national war effort since the first stages of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Without the ability to perform decisively in all areas of the conflict spectrum, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) is like a football team that comes out scoring touchdowns in the first quarter only to lose its tremendous lead by the fourth. To become a four-quarter team, the USAF must address some fundamental challenges to the way it prefers to fight (Kovich, 2006:43).

While other methods have been proposed, a newly published doctrinal manual focused on Irregular Warfare can only help to fix the perceived problem and to counter many of the criticisms. The manual definitely demonstrates that the Air Force has begun to “focus more on the war we are fighting today and less on nonexistent peer competitors and hypothetical future wars” (Kovich, 2006:47). Fortunately, *AFDD 2-3* not only does some image repair but also begins to fill the doctrinal void for the Air Force in conducting Irregular Warfare.

#### ***FM 3-24 Specific Findings and Analysis***

As noted earlier, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* has already received several criticisms from inside and outside of the military. David Price’s claim of poor scholarship, while apparently valid, has no impact on the content’s applicability of the doctrine to address the challenges of counterinsurgency warfare; therefore, offers no contributory insights to this study. A similar conclusion was reached about Ralph Peter’s points about the poor use of history since he only attempts to push for a more *coercion approach* that contradicts almost all of the critical aspects determined from the authoritative literature. Colin Kahl directly challenges the basic assumptions of Western democracies attempting COIN operations in the contemporary operational environment. While intriguing and worthy of further exploration, his tenet is beyond the scope of this

study of existing Irregular Warfare doctrine and applies more to the political decisions that force the military to engage in such operations.

Maj Gen Dunlap contends that *FM 3-24* fails to consider the potential benefits gained by a larger consideration of the options provided by airpower in COIN. While his argument counters the authoritative literature's critical aspect of *Airpower focused on ISR, Small Attack, and Transportation*, there still exists merit in his criticism. The sources of this critical point (*USMC 1940 Small Wars Manual* and David Galula's *Counterinsurgent Warfare: Theory and Practice* originally written in 1964) do not consider the vast improvements in technology applicable to the use of Airpower in COIN. *FM 3-24* should be updated to capture more guidance on the application of Airpower to COIN problems. While the nature of the operational environment will ultimately determine if Airpower is the correct solution, the readers of *FM 3-24* should be able to find more complete guidance on the benefits and detriments provided by the use of Airpower. Maj Gen Dunlap's other points tend to question particular tactics advocated by the authors or the national strategy that *FM 3-24* is trying to operationalize for action. While these points deserve further debate, they were beyond the scope of this study.

LTC Gentile's contends that the authors failed to incorporate the fighting aspect required to execute successful COIN operations. Even under the *hearts and minds* approach, he demonstrates that units may still need to fight the enemy. His argument is extremely attractive given the number of fire-fights occurring in Baghdad almost daily. The omission, however, is understandable since the authors wanted to address the large void of COIN specific doctrine. The Army and Marine Corps knew how to fight an armed enemy on conventional battlefields, but the forces could not find a reference on

how to focus on the population, build governmental legitimacy, or defeat an insurgency.


Additionally, the Army and USMC have never relied on one book to be completely comprehensive. Book shelves can be filled by doctrinal material that discusses *how-to fight* the enemy with kinetic weapons, but few discuss *how-to fight* the enemy's influence over the population with political weapons. Filling this void rapidly was the intent behind *FM 3-24*. If the manual is intended to be all inclusive, then it will have to swell beyond its current two hundred and eighty six pages.

The primary argument that *FM 3-24* is too state-centric from Ralph Wipfli and Steven Metz is valid and was captured in the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality. While they did not propose a clear alternative approach, authors, such as Barnett and Kilcullen, do offer some suggestions on ways to counter this emerging threat. This challenge deserves to be further explored in future revisions of *FM 3-24*, but the authors were attempting to fill the current void in doctrine that was plaguing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the debate continues to mature, new tenets may emerge that will have to be captured in future publications of Irregular Warfare doctrine – joint and individual service.

#### ***Specific Findings and Analysis: Roof of the IW House of Quality***

The strongest interrelationship between the two manuals is in the foundation and the planning/designing portions; as depicted in the completed IWC HOQ in Figure 18. Given the basic framework (terms with definitions, common doctrinal procedures, and other such items) provided by Joint Publications, this close correlation is not surprising. In fact, if large discrepancies existed, then the individual services' doctrinal writers would have been violating a fundamental of US military doctrine: individual service

**Figure 18: Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality: Construction Complete**



doctrine is subordinate to Joint doctrine (*JP 1-0*, 2007:A-1). The lack of correlation found in *AFDD 2-3* for *FM 3-24*'s components of *Leadership and Ethics in COIN*, *A Guide for Action*, and *Linguist Support* is equally understandable given the differences: ground-based operations vs. air-based operations and their focus of strategic to operational levels vs. tactical to operational levels. These items, however, should be included in future Joint Publications since the Army and Marine Corps receive augmentation and support from across all elements of the Department of Defense for ground operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Unless there is a huge surge in total numbers of personnel, this trend will likely continue in future conflicts.

Additionally, the weak correlation found in *AFDD 2-3* for *FM 3-24*'s chapters titled *Social Network Analysis and Other Tools* and *Legal Consideration* proves difficult to explain. Given the importance that both documents place on intelligence and understanding the local culture, the lack of practical tools to aid in analyzing these areas is a significant oversight. The analysis tools found in *Social Network Analysis and Other Tools* should be included and expanded, if possible, in future version of both manuals and in a Joint Irregular Warfare manual. Similar observations can be made about *Legal Consideration* given the ever increasing scrutiny military leaders are facing about their decisions or the actions of their subordinates.

The overlap or correlation between the other subject matter indicates that both manuals have great potential to contribute to the development of future Joint Irregular Warfare doctrine from their service's particular point of view. Like in the business community, the House of Quality only provides a communication tool, and doctrine writers and senior leaders still face some tough decisions about how to transition the

service specific points into truly joint doctrine. Additionally, the overlapping concepts indicate that a sense of commonality exists across the different service's doctrine that may be a byproduct of a sense of *Jointness*.

***Specific Findings and Analysis: Main Matrix in the IW House of Quality***

Each of the doctrinal manuals contains a void for at least one of the critical aspects for Irregular Warfare doctrine as determined by a content analysis of the authoritative literature. *FM 3-24* fails to address the *Global Aspect to the “New Insurgency.”* While this oversight can be mitigated by a skilled commander that fully understands his operational environment, it will need to be better addressed in revision or future documents. The *Global Aspect* could have been determined to be beyond the scope of the manual given the expedited nature of publication required to fill the COIN doctrine void for Iraq and Afghanistan. As indicated earlier, a better model is still being highly debated with no clear majority emerging. Given the nature of the conflict, how to best combat the global threat must be an essential component to future irregular warfare doctrine for the United States.

The Air Force's *Irregular Warfare* has two voids in accordance with the Critical Aspects from the authoritative literature: *Learning During Operation Key to Success* and *Clear-Bold-Hold Technique*. The later aspect is predominantly a ground-based tactic, but given the supporting role often played by the air assets in COIN, this should be better explained to facilitate closer ties between the ground and air forces. It could have also been omitted based on the critical comments about the tactic and alternative approach made by Maj Gen Dunlap in his influential monograph (Dunlap, 2007:43-44).

As indicated earlier, the concept of *learning during operations* has recently become more critical given the interconnectedness of societies, the communication technology proliferation, and political nature of the conflicts. The enemy is utilizing those aspects to hamper US operations and enable their operations. Only by rapidly learning about the enemy and the dynamic operational environment can the US recapture the initiative and begin to achieve success. This item could be assumed to be part of the professional culture, but a more formal description and practical techniques to accomplish *learning during operations* would improve the document given the speed at which information can now be shared when compared to previous conflicts.

Besides these voids in the individual documents, every other critical aspect from the authoritative literature is address to some extent by *AFDD 2-3* or *FM 3-24*. Only two critical aspects do not have a *very strong relationship* (3) ranking one of the documents. While *Insurgent Isolated from Population/Closely Tied to Population* and *Small Actions Preferred Over Large Unit Operations* have a *strong relationship* (2) ranking, this could indicate a potential developing gap. Future revisions of these document or publication of Joint doctrine will want to consider ways to better address this.

Based on the rankings in the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality, an objective determination of the best doctrinal document for a particular Critical Aspect has been conducted. This has been summarized in Figure 19. An X indicates the doctrinal document that had the strongest relationship with that particular aspect. In the event of a tie, the doctrinal document with that aspect across the most chapters earned the X. For two aspects there could be not determination of a clear stronger relationship. These have been denoted by double dashes (--).

**Figure 19: Best Doctrinal Sources of a Critical Aspect of IW Doctrine**  
(X = strongest relationship & -- = no clear distinction)

	FM 3-24	AFDD 2-3
IW distinct from Traditional Warfare		X
IW is Protracted Affairs	X	
Clearly Distinguishes Between Insurgents and Counterinsurgents	--	--
Emphasis on Intelligence	X	
Focus Operations on the Population & Their Support	X	
Interagency or Whole Gov't Approach to IW	X	
Insurgent Isolate from Population / Closely Tied to Population	X	
Political Aspects More Important than Military Actions	X	
Must Build Perception of Legitimacy for Gov't/Cause	X	
Understanding the Culture is Critical	X	
Learning During Operation Key to Success	X	
Must Build Indigenous/HN Capability	--	--
Media Must be Considered	X	
Information Operations Critical	X	
Small Actions Preferred Over Large Unit Operations	X	
Not all Insurgencies are the Same and Have Developmental Phases	X	
Global Aspect to "New Insurgency"		X
Clear-Build-Hold Technique	X	
Airpower focused on ISR, Small Attacks, and Transpo	X	

While this *ranking* is objective, it should not be used to justify one doctrinal manual being superior to the other manual. Instead it can be used to quickly determine which doctrinal manual has a stronger relationship with a particular Critical Aspect. Given the difference in document length, the different targeted levels of war, and the nuances of the services, there likely exists some subjectivity to the ranks that cannot be removed. Additionally, a simple merger of the existing doctrine will not produce a quality Joint document that considers all the levels of warfare. Naval and Coast Guard considerations must be included to ensure the integration of the entire Department of Defense. Interaction with other agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations must also be more fully developed in order to achieve the *Whole Government Approach*.

#### ***Specific Findings and Analysis: Basement of the IW House of Quality***

During Step 5 and 6 of the construction process, the basement of the IW House of Quality was added to the model. This analysis clearly indicated that a total of six chapters should be *deployed*, or included, in the Joint Publication. Three of the six are also paired in the Roof of the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality. *Insurgency and COIN* from FM 3-24 has a strong relationship with *Understanding IW* and *Understanding Insurgencies* from AFDD 2-3. This absolutely confirms the necessity for a clear explanation of the basic foundations for Irregular Warfare as part of any doctrinal manual on the subject. These key points will likely help shape the rest of the manual's organization, focus, strategy, and concepts.

The other concepts of *Intelligence, Social Network Analysis & Other Tools*, and *Airpower in COIN* should also be further developed for inclusion in the Joint Publication.

Like the foundation material mentioned above, these items are absolutely critical to success in COIN for the creation of synergy by a truly *joint* force.

## **Summary**

The analysis of several authoritative works that examine irregular warfare allowed the identification the critical aspects that should be included in the US military doctrine. The content analysis of existing doctrine identified the key concepts identified by the doctrine writers. The subsequent construction of the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality revealed several similarities, differences, and missing items between AFDD 2-3 *Irregular Warfare* and FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*. Additionally, some fundamentals for inclusions in an overarching joint doctrine were identified. Finally, the study revealed that some weaknesses will exist in the current doctrine if the enemies of the United States prove to be truly transnational instead of the more traditional state-based insurgency.

## **V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The finest military leaders want, indeed, demand that differing ideas be ruthlessly explored. They expect and encourage vigorous debates.... The American way of war is renewing itself. Our most powerful weapon – the competitive analysis of security issues by America’s military – is taking the field. Our enemies ought to beware. And update their wills.

---Maj Gen Dunlap and LTC Nagl in their article on the Army’s XIX Strategy Conference, April 2008 (Dunlap, 2008)

### **Summary**

This study has successfully determined a set of critical aspects that should be included in Irregular Warfare doctrine. While the list is not exhaustive and can likely be contested based on specific experiences in Irregular Warfare campaigns, the authoritative literature repeatedly echoed these key points as critical for success. Given the importance of doctrine to the military professional, a comparison of the recently published doctrine for irregular warfare against the critical aspects from the authoritative can provide some valuable lessons. Despite the danger of being perceived as petty squabbling, there is proven value in comparing the doctrine of the separate services. This series of analysis derived some over arching principles that can be incorporated into the forthcoming Joint Publication and revealed some weaknesses if the enemy proves to be transnational.

### **Conclusions**

Despite this study’s best efforts, the debate about the appropriate doctrine for irregular warfare will continue through the different journalistic mediums, the growing number of the blogs dedicated to military specific topics, the professional publications,

and focused conferences or symposiums. While the fringes are more subject to questioning, this study identified the core critical aspects as:

- Emphasis on Intelligence
- Irregular Warfare is a Protracted Affair
- Clearly Distinguishing Between Insurgents and Counterinsurgents
- Focus Operations on Population and Their Support
- Interagency (or Whole Government) Approach for Irregular Warfare
- Insurgents Must be Isolate from the Population or Must Become Closely Tied to the Population (depending on mission)
- Political Aspects are More Important than Military Actions

These items appeared in at least eight of the eleven authoritative literature works and have been echoed in countless other articles not specifically chosen for inclusion in this study. Additionally, these critical concepts have been incorporated in the published doctrine in *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* and *AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare*; with almost every one of them having a *very strong relationship* (3) with both of the documents. This uniform embrace of these topics clearly support their inclusion in the forthcoming Irregular Warfare Joint Publication.

While not as uniformly recommended by the authoritative authors and works, the aspects of *Learning During the Operations is Key to Success, Clear-Build-Hold Technique, and Airpower Focused on ISR, Small Attack, and Transportation* are also included in at least one of newly published doctrine. Significant debate will occur as the military leaders attempt to discern if such concepts will become true tenets in Joint

doctrine. Additionally, the individual services will continue their discovery process to further refine their doctrinal foundations for Irregular Warfare.

Most contemporary authors or works contend that the enemies currently confronting the United States have a definite global facet. While no consensus on the characteristics of the model has been established, the global nature creates unique challenges for confronting the insurgency. Dr. Kilcullen proposes several techniques to counter this global threat in his article, “Counterinsurgency *Redux*,” even if the US military is confined to operating inside of a partner country or host nation (Kilcullen, 2006:9-11). Hammes and Barnett suggest several actions that can be taken by the government, as a whole, in order to reduce the threat or to structure the Department of Defense to better synchronize its capability.

The analysis required to construct the Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality clearly identified where *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* and *AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare* did not simply highlight the similarities. The differences found in the separate services’ doctrine were also identified. For purposes of a general comparison of their differences the reader is referred to Figure 20. Many of these differences can be traced to the uniqueness of the services’ culture, roles and mission, and capabilities. As mentioned before, these differences will continue to contribute to the debate about the correct concepts for inclusion in the Joint doctrine. Often the individual service’s perception of the operational environment will depend upon its unique capabilities, organizational culture, leader development, and deeply held values.

**Figure 20: Difference Between Doctrinal Manuals**

<b>AFDD 2-3</b>	<b>Topic</b>	<b>FM 3-24</b>
Strategic to Operational	<b>Focused Level(s) of War</b>	Tactical to Operational
Lacking	<b>Stated Emphasis of Learning</b>	In Several Chapters
More Dominate (or even Leading) Role	<b>Amount of Emphasis on Airpower</b>	Relegated to Supporting Role; little discussion
Very Little	<b>Discussion of Ground Operations</b>	Extensive
Broad – entire IW Spectrum (more COIN though)	<b>Mission Focus</b>	Narrow – just COIN
Less; 98 pages	<b>Amount of Detail</b>	Much Greater; 260 pages
State-Based; Acknowledges Global Potential	<b>Insurgency Base</b>	Strictly State-Based
Assets for Gathering & General Guidance for Use	<b>Intelligence Focus</b>	Suggestions for Gathering, Processing, & Utilization
Generally Not Mentioned	<b>Public Criticism</b>	By Several Authors
Prefers <i>Hearts and Minds</i> but acknowledges the benefit of the applying <i>Coercion Approach</i>	<b>COIN Approach</b>	Definitely <i>Hearts and Minds</i>

## Recommendations

Several opportunities exist for further study related to this topic. Much of the debate will likely take place in less formal mediums as military leaders continue to engage in a discourse about Irregular Warfare, the applicable military doctrine, US National goals and strategy against the global insurgency, and the outcomes of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This debate should not discourage further research on the topic. Suggestions for subsequent research include:

- Exploration of the military doctrine from other countries and a subsequent comparison to the US military doctrine could provide further insights in the critical aspects. These could become competing products that could be added to the existing model or a modified model.
- Conduct a similar study on interagency documents in order to recommend Critical Aspects and doctrinal concepts to best achieve synergy across the entire US National Government much like the Joint doctrine strives for inside of DoD.
- Review the current US military's capability to achieve the critical concepts from the authoritative literature and/or the newly published doctrine. Consider the roles and missions traditionally and/or legally assigned to a particular service. Determine the impact of political influences, budget constraints, organizational culture (individual service or DoD), and professional development/experience of its leaders.
- Consider the ability to match coalition partners or host nation capabilities to the best task or mission inside an IW campaign. Identify areas that must be done by US forces, initially or throughout the operation. Determine the impact of familiarity with IW fundamentals, political or diplomatic implications, pre-existing negative relationships, and cultural differences.
- Construction of the second, third, or forth house following the House of Quality methodology may further reveal root causes/issues of the services' differences.
- Upon publication of *JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency* a similar examination of it could provide insights for the individual services about necessary changes in order to ensure compliance.
- Create objective means or indicators to measure success in the critical concepts of IW in order to better track progress. Link these measures to the desired end state of transition to the indigenous people/government and the redeployment of US forces to their home bases.
- Using a historical case study, conduct an analysis to gauge the success achieved by the application of these critical aspects or current doctrinal concepts.
- Further explore the merits and weaknesses of the two COIN approaches: *hearts and mind* vs *coercion*. An interesting historical case study to determine success or failure of the tenets could be the USSR actions in Afghanistan compared to the more recent US actions in the same country.
- Objectively continue the debate on the best role of Airpower in an Irregular Warfare campaign given the extremely complex and dynamic operational environment that dominates the contemporary globe. Additionally, further

research can focus on the applicability of Airpower in a densely populated urban terrain, such as Baghdad.

- Continue developing the model that best replicates a truly global insurgency that threatens the United States' Strategic Interests or National Security. This would include a suggestion on the necessary modifications to existing Service doctrine, yet-to-be published Joint doctrine, or any interagency guidance documents.
- Create a more objective method to determine the Relative Importance of the Customer Attributes and the Potential Applicability to Joint Warfare for the Counterpart Characteristics.
- Examination of the Traditional Warfare doctrine to determine the actual gaps between it and the flood of Irregular Warfare doctrine recently published. Additional consideration could consider the force structure's ability to accomplish the stated doctrine or recommend changes to best accomplish the assigned roles and missions.

Further researching these recommendations will assist the United States military in better preparing for the continuing evolving threats of the ever increasingly globalized world.

## APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS / ABBREVIATIONS

**AFDD** – Air Force Doctrine Document  
**CA** – Customer Attribute  
**CC** – Counterpart Characteristic  
**COIN** – Counterinsurgency  
**CJCSM** – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual  
**CMO** – Civil-Military Operations  
**CONOPS** – Concepts of Operations  
**CT** – Counterterrorism  
**DA** – Department of the Army  
**DoD** – Department of Defense  
**FID** – Foreign Internal Defense  
**FM** – Field Manual (U.S. Army Doctrine)  
**GWOT** – Global War on Terrorism  
**HN** – Host Nation  
**HOQ** – House of Quality  
**HQ** – Headquarters  
**IA** – Interagency  
**IO** – Information  
**IW** – Irregular Warfare  
**IWC HOQ** – Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality  
**JP** – Joint Publication (Doctrine for the Joint Force)  
**JOC** – Joint Operating Concept  
**LTC** – Lieutenant Colonel (Army abbreviation for Officer Grade 5)  
**Lt Col** – Lieutenant Colonel (Air Force abbreviation for Officer Grade 5)  
**MAJ** – Major (Army abbreviation for Officer Grade 4)  
**Maj** – Major (Air Force abbreviation for Officer Grade 4)  
**Maj Gen** – Major General (Air Force abbreviation for Officer Grade 8)  
**MCWP** – Marine Corps Warfighting Publication  
**NATO** – North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
**NGO** – Nongovernmental Organization  
**OSD** – Office of the Secretary of Defense  
**QFD** – Quality Function Deployment  
**SOF** – Special Operations Forces  
**TPP** – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures  
**US** – United States of America  
**USA** – United States Army  
**USAF** – United States Air Force  
**USMC** – United States Marine Corps  
**USN** – United States Navy  
**USG** – United States Government  
**USSOCOM** – United States Special Operations Command  
**UW** – Unconventional Warfare

## **APPENDIX B: DETAILS FROM FM 3-24 COUNTERINSURGENCY**

### **Historical Principles of Counterinsurgency (FM3-24, 2006:1-21to1-24):**

- Legitimacy is the Main Objective
- Unity of Effort is Essential
- Political Factors Are Primary
- Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment
- Intelligence Drives Operations
- Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support
- Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential
- Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for the Long Term Commitment

### **Contemporary Imperative of Counterinsurgency (FM3-24, 2006:1-24to1-26):**

- Manage Information and Expectations
- Use the Appropriate Level of Force
- Learn and Adapt
- Empower the Lower Levels
- Support the Host Nation

### **Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations (FM3-24, 2006:1-26to1-28):**

- Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be
- Sometimes, the More Force is Used, the Less Effective It Is
- The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is, the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk Must be Accepted
- Sometimes Doing Nothing Is the Best Reaction
- Some of the Best Weapon for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot
- The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably Is Normally Better than Us Doing It Well
- If a Tactic Works this Week, It Might Not Work Next Week; If it Works in this Province, It Might Not Work in the Next
- Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing
- Many Important Decisions Are Not Made by Generals

## APPENDIX C: DETAILS FROM AFDD 2-3 IRREGULAR WARFARE

Figure 21: USAF Irregular Warfare Model (AFDD2-3, 2007:5)




Figure 21 highlights the Irregular Warfare Spectrum and its key activities as determined by the writers of *AFDD 2-3*. Below those activities are listed the key capabilities that the AF views as most likely to be utilized during execution of an Irregular Warfare campaign, but the writers caution against artificially limiting options to just the ones listed (*AFDD2-3, 2007:5*).

### IW Truths for Airmen (AFDD2-3, 2007:8-10):

- The Air Force must be prepared to simultaneously conduct irregular and traditional warfare operations.
- IW is a different form of warfare and not a lesser form of conflict within traditional warfare. The struggle for legitimacy and influence over a relevant population is the primary focus of operations, not the coercion of key political leaders or defeat of their military capability.

- IW is intelligence-intensive.
- Unity of effort across all instruments of power is essential to overall strategic success.
- Integrated C2 structures enable flexibility at all levels and are vital to successful counterinsurgency operations.
- Operational effectiveness can be very difficult to measure; thus feedback through a strong assessment and lessons learned process is essential to strategic success.
- The adversary may be highly complex and adaptive.

**COIN Truths for Airmen (AFDD2-3, 2007:10-11):**


- Legitimacy and influence are the main objectives.
- The Air Force provides critical capabilities that enable joint force operations in COIN.
- Military actions are a necessary part of any COIN strategy; military actions that affect the adversary's will or capability must be integrated with the JFC's objective to influence the populace.
- A key adversary strength is the ability to hide within the populace – countering many key advantages of traditional military power.
- COIN is a protracted affair.

**COIN & Support to COIN Tasks (AFDD2-3, 2007:19-25):**

- Provide Security
- Help Alleviate Root Causes
- Limit an Adversary's Conventional Options and Flexibility
- Disrupt Enemy Movement
- Target Insurgent Leaders and Active Supporters
- Air and Ground Coordination

## APPENDIX D: IW JOINT OPERATING CONCEPT LOGIC

Figure 22: Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept Logic (IW JOC, 2007:8)



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## Vita

Major James M. Kimbrough IV graduated in 1990 from Fayette County High School in Fayetteville, Georgia. After a year at the University of Georgia, he entered undergraduate studies at the United States Military Academy at West Point, NY. He graduated with a Bachelor of Science Degree in International Relations in June of 1995 and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant of Infantry in the US Army.

After completing the Infantry Officer Basic Course at Fort Benning, Georgia, he reported to Fort Stewart, Georgia for assignment with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of the 15<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment. He served as a Mechanized Infantry Platoon Leader, Company Executive Officer, and the Battalion Maintenance Officer; including 4 months deployed to Kuwait in support of Intrinsic Action. After graduation from the Infantry Captain Career Course at Fort Benning, CPT Kimbrough reported to Fort Polk, Louisiana for assignment as the Combat Training Center Planner for the Post G3. Afterwards he served as the Regimental Training Officer for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Armored Cavalry Regiment (2ACR), as the Commander for Mad Dog Company, 2ACR, and the Commander of 3<sup>rd</sup> Squadron's Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 2ACR; including 15 months deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Upon his return in 2004, CPT Kimbrough was assigned to be a Small Group Instructor for the Captains Career Course at the US Army Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky. He subsequently was selected to attend the Graduate School of Engineering and Management, Air Force Institute of Technology starting in May 2007. Upon graduation, he will attend the School of Advanced Airpower and Space Studies at Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, AL.

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>				<i>Form Approved OMB No. 074-0188</i>
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)  30-05-2008	2. REPORT TYPE  <b>Graduate Research Project</b>	3. DATES COVERED (From – To)  May 2007 - June 2008		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Examining US Irregular Warfare Doctrine		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER  5b. GRANT NUMBER  5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S)  Kimbrough, James M. IV, Major, US Army		5d. PROJECT NUMBER  5e. TASK NUMBER  5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S)  Air Force Institute of Technology Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN) 2950 Hobson Street, Building 642 WPAFB OH 45433-7765			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER  AFIT/ILM/ENS/08-04	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.				
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> <p>The United States' overwhelming conventional military superiority has forced its enemies for the foreseeable future to fight it unconventionally, mixing modern technology with the classic techniques of insurgency and terrorism. In response to the associated strategic challenges, a growing debate occurred among military historians, strategists, and leaders about the proper principles necessary for contemporary irregular warfare, particularly against a potential transnational enemy. Without a Joint Publication to serve as a guide, several of the individual services have recently published updated doctrine to address the subject: <i>Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3: Irregular Warfare</i> in August 2007 and <i>Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24: Counterinsurgency</i> in December 2006 (jointly published as <i>Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5: Counterinsurgency</i>).</p> <p><i>Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency</i> has an anticipated release of May 2009. The detailed content analysis of AFDD 2-3, FM 3-24, and several authoritative documents required to construct a House of Quality would provide several insights for the doctrine writers; each document would be contrasted against the authoritative works and against each other. Similarities, differences, missing fundamentals, and overarching doctrinal concepts were determined by examining this study's Irregular Warfare Concept House of Quality and can guide the writers in critical concepts for inclusion. Additionally, analysis revealed some implications if the enemy proves to be truly transnational instead of the more traditional state-base threats.</p>				
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> <p>House of Quality; Irregular Warfare; Insurgency; Counterinsurgency (COIN); Doctrine; <i>Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency</i> (FM3-24); <i>Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3: Irregular Warfare</i> (AFDD 2-3); US Air Force; US Army</p>				
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:		17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Richard F. Deckro, DAF (ENS)
a. REPORT  U	b. ABSTRACT  U	c. THIS PAGE  U	UU	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (937) 255-6565, ext 4325; e-mail: <a href="mailto:richard.deckro@afit.edu">richard.deckro@afit.edu</a>

